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the strength of party majorities) and ideology (in terms of the ideological distance
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and ideology drive legislative outcomes. This dissertation demonstrates that divided
government is a much more complex political phenomenon. Furthermore, this research
suggests that the presidential-congressional relationship may be less adverse during
periods of divided party control than periods of unified party control. This underscores
the need to include measures that capture the components of divided government in
future studies on related topics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Era of Divided Government
When the Republican Party increased its majority of seats in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate in the 2004 election, it ensured itself of another two years
of unified government under President George W. Bush. This unified party control has
become rather uncommon in American national politics, especially over the last 40 years.
There have been 29 congresses elected since 1949, of which 16 have faced a president
from a different political party. Thirteen of the twenty-three congresses since 1967 have
encountered divided government1. The prevalence of this political phenomenon has
made it a topic of considerable concern, both in the Washington community and in
academia.
Immediately following the 2004 elections, the popular consensus was that the
president had an increased ability to pursue his agenda in Washington. It was also
assumed that had the Democrats gained a majority in either the House of Representatives
or the Senate, the president’s policy agenda would have been dead on arrival. Yet, as the
2006 congressional elections approach, it appears that the president received little benefit
from unified government. His main domestic program, social security reform, never
came up for a vote in Congress. Republicans also pleaded with the president to abandon

1

Senator James Jeffords’ (Vermont) changed his party affiliation from
Republican to Independent in mid-2001. The Jeffords defection wrestled control of the
Senate from the Republican Party, giving the Democratic Party the slimmest of majorities
(50 Democrats, 49 Republicans, 1 Independent). The statistics on the prevalence of
divided government treat the 107th Congress (2001-02) as being controlled by the
Democratic Party, and thus a period of divided government.
1

any effort at tax reform. Furthermore, immigration reform deeply divided the more
moderate Senate Republicans from their more conservative brethren in the House of
Representatives. Hence, contrary to expectations, unified government did not lead to an
active and successful political agenda. Additionally, polls show broad dissatisfaction
with both the President and Congress and, as of the spring of 2006, it appears that the
Democratic Party has at least a reasonable prospect of regaining a majority of seats in the
House of Representatives for the first time since 1994. If the conventional wisdom about
divided government is correct, such an outcome would stymie President Bush’s ability to
work with members of Congress for the remainder of his second term.
Although this conventional wisdom would lead one to believe that unified
government provides a more advantageous political legislative environment for the
president and Congress, this may not be the case, as the Bush example suggests. Despite
assumptions about the effect of this political phenomenon, the degree to which divided
government presents a more adverse political environment than unified government is
really an empirical question, one over which there has been considerable disagreement.
This disagreement is driven both by how “divided government” is conceptualized and
measured.
Previous scholarship has used the terms “divided government” and “divided party
control” interchangeably. This dissertation contends, however, that these are distinct
concepts. “Divided government” is a function of both a partisan dimension and an
ideological dimension. As such, party control is only one component of divided/unified
government. In this dissertation, my objective is to reconcile some of the disparate
findings within the scholarly literature as well as to explain apparent anomalies, such as

2

the failure of the Bush administration to govern with a Republican controlled Congress
after the 2004 elections.
The Focus on Divided Government
Divided government and closely related subjects, such as the greater propensity of
gridlock between the president and Congress, are much discussed and debated in the
media and among private citizens. Divided government also has been a widely debated
topic in the political science literature. Given the recurrence of divided government in
recent decades, an increasing number of political scientists have examined questions
related to this topic2. While some have sought to explain the origins of divided
government (Burden and Kimball 1998; 2002; Fiorina 1996), many others have studied
the effect of divided government on various political outcomes (Binder 1999; 2003;
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Mayhew 1991). In fact, there have been well over
fifty studies (many of them which I discuss in Chapter 2) examining this topic over the
past decade or so. It is a central focus of attention among Congressional and presidential
scholars (including those studying bureaucratic politics). Still, while it has received such
vast attention recently, the literature has yet to come to a consensus about the effect of
divided government on American political outcomes. Some have argued that there is no
significant difference between unified and divided government. If these scholars are
correct, then President Bush should have a similar ability to work with a Democratic
Congress as he would a Republican legislature. Others have disagreed, contending that

2

In this dissertation, I often refer to divided government, without also mentioning
unified government each time. These terms are complements of one another, so any
discussion of divided government is also a discussion of unified government. While
these terms are not interchangeable, the statements made here could easily be reworded to
address unified government instead of divided government.
3

divided government negatively affects political outcomes, posing a more adverse or
deleterious political environment for both the president and for Congress. If this group of
researchers is correct, then a Democratic Congress elected in 2006 could severely hamper
President Bush’s agenda in his final two years in office. What explains these conflicting
findings on the effects of divided government?
This research contends that the seemingly contradictory findings on divided
government are largely the result of our failure to understand what this political
phenomenon really means. While most scholars have treated divided government as a
one-dimensional concept, I argue that previous scholars have failed to address both of the
components of divided government: party and ideology. Additionally, these components
have varied greatly in the post-World War II period, making the findings of many
previous studies dependent on the time period examined. In sum, by better understanding
the components of divided government and their effect on political outcomes, we may be
able to reconcile the differences found in the divided government literature.

Plan for the Dissertation
As I note here, there has been considerable research on the subject of divided
government, though much of it comes to contradictory conclusions about the effects. In
Chapter Two, I first provide a general discussion of what is meant by the term divided
government. Then, I examine how it has been discussed in the literature to date, before
expanding on the traditional definition of divided government. While most work has
viewed divided government as a simple dichotomous political phenomenon, I describe
various components of divided government, asserting that it is in fact much more
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complex construct than is commonly thought. I then examine each component of divided
government, and why we should expect each to affect presidential-congressional
relations.
In Chapter Three, I address how the literature previously has operationalized
divided government and then develops a new way to conceptualize and measure this
phenomenon. The vast majority of studies has treated divided government as
unidimensional, and has employed a dummy variable to measure divided government, a
measure that I argue is both theoretically and methodologically flawed. I improve on this
crude measure by measuring the components of divided government separately. I also
consider how these variables can be measured in aggregate-level models.
Chapter Four examines the effects of divided government on three dependent
variables that have been used in seminal studies of presidential-congressional relations.
First, I examine presidential concurrence rates in Congress at the aggregate-level. Next, I
re-examine one of the central studies of divided government by reanalyzing Mayhew’s
dependent variable, while considering the effect of the components of divided
government on the number of major laws enacted in Congress. Lastly, I study the
components of divided government with respect to failed pieces of legislation. Thus I
examine both legislative success and legislative failure.
Chapter 5 evaluates the components of divided government in individual-level
analyses. Rather than examining dependent variables that are aggregated to the two-year
Congress, this chapter analyzes the effect of these components on the probability that the
president will “win” on individual roll-call votes. The goal of this chapter is to
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demonstrate the applicability of the measures developed in this dissertation to dependent
variables at both the aggregate and individual levels.
Finally, in Chapters 6 I summarize the findings and discuss their relevance for the
broader political science literature. Additionally, I discuss avenues for future research.
The final chapter also discusses other variables that may be examined using the measures
offered here.

Copyright © Jeffrey Allen Fine 2006
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Chapter 2
Understanding Divided Government
Key questions:
• What effect does divided government have on legislative outcomes?
• What does divided government mean? What are the components of divided
government? Which components of divided government have been shown to
affect legislative outcomes?
Previous Studies of Divided Government and Legislative Outcomes
It is conventional wisdom that it should be harder for presidents to work with
Congress in periods of divided government rather than periods of unified government.
Pundits, politicians, and scholars have discussed divided government as a deleterious
political environment for both Congress and the president. Many treat this as an
established fact, yet the political science literature has not reached a consensus on the
issue.
Over the last 15 years, more than fifty separate studies have examined the causes
of divided government, as well as the effect of divided government on countless
dependent variables that are pertinent to the presidential-congressional relationship. This
scholarship has generated seemingly conflicting results, with some finding support for the
conventional perspective and others concluding that divided government does not impede
executive-legislative cooperation. Although the vast literature on divided government
examines its effect on dozens of different dependent variables, this dissertation focuses
on those variables that are most closely tied to presidential-congressional relations. The
primary concentration here is on legislative outcomes, including bill passage and failure.
As we shall see in this chapter, in addition to legislative productivity, the literature has
examined many presidential-congressional variables: “gridlock” in general, the judicial
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and executive branch nomination/confirmation process, executive orders and other
unilateral presidential actions, and congressional investigations of the executive branch.
Legislative Success and Failure
The political science literature’s focus on divided government intensified in the
wake of David Mayhew’s (1991) now seminal work on the subject, Divided We Govern.
Mayhew questioned the conclusions of early political science research that argued that
divided government provided a more deleterious political environment than unified
government. Mayhew examined the enactment of major pieces of legislation during
periods of both unified and divided government (Cutler 1988; Sundquist 1988). His
results challenged the conventional wisdom, as he found no statistically significant
difference between the number of major legislative enactments during unified and
divided government periods. Jones (1994) re-examined Mayhew’s work, ultimately
echoing the assertion that divided government did not hamper legislative innovation more
than unified government. Given that these findings present such a stark contrast to
conventional wisdom, the effects of divided government have been examined by many
subsequent studies. For the most part these studies have challenged Mayhew’s and
Jones’ conclusions.
Some of the criticism of Mayhew’s work has revolved around his choice of
dependent variables, the number of major pieces of legislation that passed during a twoyear period. Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) offered an early revision of the Mayhew
conclusion in their study on legislative failure (also see (Coleman 1999). They contend
that while legislative success and failure seem, on the surface, to be essentially the same
phenomenon, this is not the case. The number of legislative successes partly depends on
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the total number of possible items on the legislative agenda. In other words, when many
items are on the agenda, the number of successful bills may not change, but the number
of failed bills may increase. Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) demonstrate that there is
a statistically significant difference between the number of bills that fail during periods of
unified and divided government.
Other work on legislative failure focuses on the president’s veto power. This veto
power can be wielded formally by the president or presidents can simply threaten to use it
to kill or shape legislation. Groseclose and McCarty (2001) and Woolley (1991) have
shown that presidents are more likely to veto legislation during periods of divided party
control. Presidents are also more likely to engage in veto bargaining when their party
does not control both chambers of Congress (Cameron 2000). Research has thus shown
that failure at various stages of the legislative process is more likely during periods of
divided government.
Gridlock
The discrepancy between the studies of legislative success and legislative failure
sparked a third wave of research on legislative productivity in Congress. Rather than
focusing only on the number of bills that passed or failed, scholars interested in the
legislative process also considered the total number of possible items on the agenda. In
this vein, they examined the level of “gridlock” in Congress, and its relationship with
divided government (Binder 1999; Binder 2003; Coleman 1999; Jones 1994). “Gridlock”
is defined as the amount of legislation passed, divided by the total number of possible
pieces of legislation (Mayhew 1991; Binder 1999; Binder 2003, for example). This
calculation yields the percentage of issues that pass and fail during a given congressional
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session. As Binder (2003) notes, “framed this way, gridlock is best viewed as the share
of salient issues on the nation’s agenda that is left in limbo at the close of a Congress”
(2003: 20). To measure the legislative agenda, Binder (2003) employs content analysis
of news stories to determine the total number of possible pieces of legislation.3 Binder’s
conclusion, that gridlock is more prevalent during divided than unified government, again
challenges Mayhew’s conclusion while reaffirming the conventional wisdom about the
deleterious effect of divided party control.4
Other scholars have offered rational-choice models of legislative gridlock, though
not all of these reach conclusions similar to Binder. Keith Krehbiel (1998) examines the
relationship between the president and Congress through the prism of “pivotal” actors.
Rather than arguing that every member of Congress is an important player, Krehbiel
asserts that the key actors are the median member of Congress, the 60th member
necessary to invoke cloture (the “filibuster pivot”), and the 67th member necessary to
overturn a presidential veto (the “veto pivot”). The preferences of these pivotal players
in the system determine the “gridlock interval,” which affects how much legislation gets
enacted in Congress (as well as the content of that legislation). According to Krehbiel, it
is this gridlock interval, rather than divided government, that decreases the flow of
legislation through the chamber and increases the amount of policy stagnation. However,
according to Krehbiel gridlock is also possible when the presidency and Congress are
3

Binder (2003) creates five gridlock measures, with each of these representing a different
level of legislative salience. After generating the total number of possible items for
legislative enactment, Binder determines the amount of gridlock present in a given
congressional session.
4
Jones (2001) also examines the antecedents of legislative gridlock. Though his measure
of items on the legislative agenda differs from the Binder measure (he uses
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, rather than the New York Times), the substantive
conclusions of his piece are consistent with those of Binder (1999; 2003).
10

held by the same party. This model is similar to one offered by Brady and Volden
(2006), as both models originated from collaborative work by all three of these authors
(Brady, Volden, and Krehbiel 1994). In their book, Brady and Volden underscore the
importance of the median member, as well as the other players that Krehbiel (1998)
describes. In both of these works, however, the authors discuss how gridlock is possible
under both unified and divided party control. Brady and Volden (2006) assert that the
current Congress is an example of gridlock under unified government:
When this gridlock occurs under unified party control of government, we call it
unified gridlock. Unified gridlock resulted under the 103rd Congress during the
first two years of the Clinton administration. Unified gridlock explains the limits
on major policy change in the 109th Congress today.

The prevalence of gridlock under both divided and unified party control again
demonstrates some conflict in the literature, as the conclusions of these rational choice
theories are not consistent with Binder’s findings.
More recent work has revised the Krehbiel model, allowing for variation in the
effects of party and preferences of members (Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Epstein,
Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming). Epstein, Kristensen, and O’Halloran
(Forthcoming) challenge the Krehbiel conclusion that the width of the gridlock interval
significantly affects legislation, as opposed to divided government. These scholars,
employing a more appropriate measure of the gridlock interval (Krehbiel used shifts in
party seats, while they use a measure of ideology), find that it does not have a significant
effect, while divided government does significantly promote legislative stalemate. Chiou
and Rothenberg (2003) find mixed evidence regarding the effect of divided government
on gridlock. They examine the topic using various gridlock measures as the dependent
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variable - the Binder (2003) measures and Coleman (1999) measure, for example. While
divided government does significantly affect gridlock in some models, this finding is not
universal.
A third set of studies re-examining Mayhew’s conclusion utilize measures of
legislative “productivity.” These studies improve on the Mayhew data, as they typically
have more nuanced classifications of “significant” legislation. Using these improved
classifications, scholars have reached conclusions that also rival those of the original
Mayhew study. Kelly (1993) finds that significant legislation is more likely during
unified party control. Howell, Adler, Cameron and Reimann (2000) create four distinct
categories of legislative significance, with different findings for each classification.
While, like Kelly (1993), they find that the passage of the most important legislation is
less likely during periods of divided government, Howell et al. (2000) find that the some
legislation is actually more likely during divided government5. Again, the choice of
dependent variable and the data choices made by specific researchers have important
implications for examining the relationship between divided government and the
likelihood of legislative passage/failure.
Yet, criticism of Mayhew’s conclusion is not limited merely to the choice of
dependent variable. It also involves the methods Mayhew employed. Howell et al.
(2000) argue that the Mayhew data suffer from time-serial problems. Specifically, these
authors demonstrate that the data utilized by Mayhew are non-stationary, biasing the
results of his models. When the non-stationary nature of the data is taken into account,
5

Howell, Adler, Cameron and Reimann (2000) find that the legislation deemed
the least important actually passes at a higher rate during divided government than during
unified government. This seems to indicate that gridlock is likely on the legislation that
both parties care about, and legislation that receives the most attention.
12

divided government does hamper legislative success in Congress. Meanwhile, Epstein, et
al (Forthcoming) argue that Mayhew’s main independent variable, policy activism, is
atheoretical. In fact, its inclusion in the model may account for the non-significant
finding with regard to the effects of divided government.
In sum, while early scholars challenged the conventional wisdom by arguing that
there was no significant difference between unified and divided party control, this
conclusion has been the subject of numerous subsequent studies, many of which refute
Mayhew’s basic findings.
Presidential Success Rates
Measuring the amount of legislative success and failure, or legislative
productivity and gridlock, is obviously important for understanding legislative behavior.
Some scholars, however, have postulated that these variables do not capture accurately
the presidential-congressional dynamic. Bond and Fleisher (1990), for example, discuss
at length different measures of “presidential success” in Congress. The measure they
employ, “individual presidential support scores,” allows us to understand how often
Congress delivers a product that the president desires. These support scores, also referred
to as “presidential success scores,” first determine the bills on which the president has a
clearly stated position. The support scores are simply the percentage of these bills in
which a majority of the chamber votes with the presidential position. In other words,
how often does Congress vote with the president?
Bond and Fleisher (1990) examine, among other things, the effect of divided
government on these presidential support scores. They largely discuss this question in
terms of “minority” and “majority” presidents, classifying chief executives by whether
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his party held a majority or minority of seats in Congress. They conclude, “while unified
party control is no guarantee of success on any given vote, the probability of defeat
increases significantly when the branches are controlled by different parties” (230). This
affirms the findings of others (Cutler 1988; Sundquist 1988) who argue that divided
government does depress the success rate for certain legislation in Congress.
Other Presidential-Congressional Variables
In addition to the amount of legislation passed in Congress, scholars have also
examined how divided government affects the content of legislation. Epstein and
O’Halloran (1996; 1999) and Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler (2001) observed that while the
number of legislative enactments does not vary between times of unified and divided
government, the legislative content does. Congress delegates greater levels of discretion
to the bureaucracy when a president of the same party inhabits the White House and less
discretion during periods of divided government. Krutz (2001a; 2001b) also found that
omnibus legislation is more prevalent when the president and the majority of Congress
are controlled by different parties.
The success and failure of legislation is not the only dependent variable examined
in presidential-congressional studies. Despite the great deal of attention paid to
legislation, an increasing amount of attention has been paid to other presidentialcongressional variables. Mayhew’s Divided We Govern (1991) not only examined
legislative productivity, it also examined the proclivity of Congress to investigate the
behavior of members of the executive branch. Mayhew’s conclusion with respect to
these investigations is consistent with his conclusions about legislative enactments: the
effects of divided and unified government are not significantly different from one
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another. Although this dependent variable has not been revisited with the same vigor as
Mayhew’s legislative chapters, recent congressional investigations seem to present new
evidence that rival this conclusion. The congressional investigations of the Clinton
administration, many of which occurred during periods of divided government (and
which obviously took place after the publication of the Mayhew study) suggest that
executive branch investigations may indeed be more likely to occur during divided
government – perhaps more so than during unified government. The paucity of
congressional investigations during the present Bush administration suggests the same
conclusion.
An increasing number of studies have considered the effect of divided
government on presidential nominations. When different parties control the presidency
and Congress, presidential nominations may be less likely to be confirmed by the Senate.
This hypothesis has been tested in recent studies, which have found that divided
government affects both the success rate of presidential nominees and the length of the
confirmation process. These studies of presidential nominations include nominations to
fill both executive branch positions and judicial vacancies. Much like the literature on
legislative success and failure, this literature has presented conflicting accounts. Some
scholars have demonstrated that divided government adversely affects the confirmation
process (Binder and Maltzman 2002; McCarty and Razaghian 1999; Shipan and Shannon
2003). According to these scholars, divided government leads to delay in the
confirmation process (Binder and Maltzman 2002; Shipan and Shannon 2003), though if
the nominations are made early in a presidential term the confirmation is often inevitable.
Still, some argue that presidential nominees are much more likely to fail during periods
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of divided government (McCarty and Razaghian 1999), while others contend that there is
no significant difference between the success rate of presidential nominees during unified
and divided party control (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998). These findings apply both to
judicial and executive branch nominees, underscoring the importance of revisiting the
effect of divided government on a variety of outcomes.
Unilateral Presidential Actions
Recent work on presidential-congressional relations has examined instances when
the president behaves independently of Congress to achieve some political goal.
Although this behavior is outside the traditional bounds of presidential-congressional
relations, I examine these unilateral presidential actions because this recent work posits
that the president intentionally avoids working with the legislature as a means of
sidestepping political obstacles.
Kenneth Mayer has conducted extensive research on presidential use of executive
orders. Mayer (2001; 1999) demonstrates a bizarre finding regarding the relationship
between executive orders and divided government. Theoretically, we should expect
presidents to issue more executive orders during periods of divided government, as
presidents seeking change avoid a potentially adversarial Congress. However, Mayer
finds the opposite to be true: Presidents issue more executive orders during periods of
unified government. This perplexing conclusion has not been fully explained in the
literature.
Other related work examines various unilateral actions that presidents engage in
to circumvent a Congress controlled by an opposing party. Howell (2003) expands
rational choice models of executive-legislative relations by including instances where the
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president takes action without consulting Congress. Howell finds that these unilateral
tactics are more common during divided party control, indicating that there is evidence
that presidents do, in fact, act strategically (beyond the use of executive orders) to
achieve political goals without the aid of members of Congress. As with several other
dependent variables, the findings in the unilateral actions literature are somewhat
contradictory, only heightening the need for further study of divided government’s
effects.
Across the span of these different dependent variables, and even within some,
there is disagreement over the effects of divided government. Some of these findings
support the conventional wisdom that states presidents and Congress should be less likely
to work well together when they are controlled by different political parties. Other work,
however, brings into question whether divided government actually poses a negative
political environment at all. Before we can further examine whether divided government
actually poses a more adverse political environment than does unified government, it is
necessary to evaluate what divided government actually means. In so doing, we may be
able to reconcile some of the differences that emerge in the scholarly literature.

Defining Divided Government
The term “divided government” has, to date, been defined in a rather
straightforward manner: a period when the party that controls the presidency does not
control both chambers of Congress. This definition emphasizes the most basic
component of the divided government phenomenon: party control of political institutions.
This traditional definition contradicts the justification for examining divided government

17

with respect to various dependent variables; namely that divided government represents a
more adverse relationship between the president and Congress. Control of Congress by
an opposition party itself may not necessarily pose a threat to the president and his
agenda. Instead, there are other components than party control that matter when
considering presidential-congressional relations. Rather than equating “divided
government” with “divided party control,” I contend that these are distinct concepts.
Divided government contains two theoretically distinct components, party control and
ideology.6
Party Component
Party control is the obvious component of divided government, as these terms
have been used interchangeably in the literature. In addition to mere control of
legislative chambers, the degree to which the president’s party controls these chambers is
also important. When the president’s party does not control a majority of seats in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, divided party control exists. This majority
may hold only one extra seat or it may outnumber the opposition by a wide margin.
However, very few individuals would argue that the size of a party’s majority (i.e. the

6

One possible component of divided government that will not be included here is
congressional rules and procedures (See Evans 1999 for a thorough review of this
literature). Although there are reasons to expect that rules and procedures of Congress
affect legislative outcomes, it is difficult to measure these effects. As Evans (1999)
notes, data necessary to examine “the linkage between rules and outcomes…are seldom
available” (605-06). Further, the exclusion of rules in models of legislative outcomes
will not bias the results of this research, as there is no theoretical reason to expect these
rules to be related to divided government. It is possible, even probable, that the use of
certain procedures is more common during divided government. However, the
examination of these as dependent variables is beyond the scope of this research. Some
factors typically grouped with rules and procedures - for example, the filibuster, decisions
by committee and party leadership, and committee jurisdictions (Evans 1999)- will be
discussed in relation to other components of divided government discussed above.
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gap between the number of seats held by the majority party and the minority party) is
irrelevant. Unified and divided party control is determined by seat allocations (along
with the party of the president), and in this regard the distribution of seats determines the
degree of party control
In addition to the size of the partisan majority (minority), there are other
dimensions of the “party” component of divided government: party control of legislative
committees and chamber leadership positions. When a political party controls a majority
of seats in the House of Representatives and/or the Senate, that party also controls the
chairmanship of every committee in that chamber. During periods of unified party
control, the chairman of every congressional committee is from the same party as the
president. During divided party control, however, the committee chairmen (in at least
one chamber) are held by a party other than that of the president. Similarly, the
allocation of seats on congressional committees is determined by the partisan
composition of the entire chamber. The control of these committee leaders and seats are
a function of party control of Congress, and is thus a component of the larger
phenomenon of “divided government.”
The chamber leadership positions are also determined by partisan control. When
the Republican Party retained its control of both the House and the Senate following the
2004 elections, they also maintained control of the congressional leadership positions.
Specifically, Republicans hold all the positions of Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Majority Leader, and Majority Whips. In the Senate, the Majority
Leaders and Whips are Republicans by virtue of their majority party status, while the
Democratic Party selects the Minority Leader and Whips in both chambers. These
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chamber leadership positions are also a component of divided government, as they are a
direct function of partisan control of each legislative chamber. During unified party
control, the president’s party holds the chamber leadership positions, while the opposition
party controls these positions during periods of divided party control. The chamber
leadership is thus another component of “divided government.”
Ideological Component
Divided government may also bring with it an increased amount of ideological
distance between the president and key members of Congress. As party control of a
chamber differs from the party of the president, many potentially important congressmen
and senators will be members of the opposition party. As a result, it is possible that the
members from the opposition party will have policy preferences that are very different
from those of the president. However, this may not always be the case. For example,
Southern Democrats in the 1960s were far more conservative than the Democratic
presidents of the same time (Kennedy and Johnson). This is true of both the rank-and-file
members of Congress and also those in leadership positions. Just as the control of
committee chairs and chamber leaders are variants of the party control of divided
government, so too are the ideologies of these members variants of the ideological
component. Those in leadership positions may have preferences similar to the average
member from their party, or they may be have preferences outside the mainstream. The
ideology of these members is meaningful, as it represents the degree to which
(dis)agreement exists between the president and members of the legislature.
As most studies have considered divided government in terms of party control,
the relationship between ideology and divided government is an empirical question that
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requires further attention. Despite the view that divided government poses a more
“adverse” political environment, this conventional wisdom has not been tested fully, that
is, considering these distinct aspects of divided government. Only some of the
components of divided government have been included in previous studies, again with
mixed results.

Merging Two Literatures
As discussed above, there is a great deal of literature examining the effects of
divided government on various presidential-congressional outcomes. However, given
that these previous studies have used “divided party control” to mean “divided
government,” this research has not fully explored both components of the larger
phenomenon of divided government.
The scholarly literature has not ignored the components of divided government
altogether. On the contrary, these factors have been examined at great length, with
various studies examining the effect of one of these components on a particular
dependent variable. In the past, the literature examining party effects and ideology
effects have treated these as competing forces. I contend that both of these are part of the
larger “divided government” phenomenon, and that one or both of these may drive any
particular legislative outcome. In other words, party effects and ideology effects are not
mutually exclusive. By conceptualizing divided government only in terms of party
control, and by viewing party and ideology as completely distinct, the literature
examining the effects of these components of divided government provides contradictory
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results. The phenomenon of divided government can be understood better by merging
the literatures on party effects and ideological effects.
Party
As party control has been used to define divided government, the existing
literature on divided government has really been an extensive review of this one narrow
component of the larger divided government phenomenon. As discussed above, there is
mixed evidence on the effect of party control. However, the literature on party effects are
not confined to the “divided government” literature. The party component of divided
government has also received a great deal of treatment in other areas of the political
science literature.
Much has been written on the subject of political parties in the American system,
with many studies examining legislative outcomes. While some scholars find evidence to
support the claim that parties affect legislative behavior, this finding is not universal.
Some scholars assert that political parties drive roll-call voting in Congress. This
literature argues that it is partisanship of members of Congress, rather than the policy
preferences of these members, that affects voting behavior (Aldrich and Rohde 1998;
Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Hager and Talbert 2000; Snyder and
Groseclose 2000; Strattman 2000). Not only are bills affected by partisanship, but so are
presidential nominations. Additionally, party affiliation may drive coalition formation in
Congress, as legislators will seek to bargain with other members of their own party as
they seek a majority of support for a particular bill. (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman
1999).
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Other work has yielded contradictory results about the effects of party control.
The literature discussing the effects of divided government on legislative outcomes (or
lack thereof) is essentially testing how party control shapes presidential-congressional
relations. Research has indicated that party does not matter in terms of legislative
outcomes, as no significant relationship exists (Jones 1994; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond
1998; Mayhew 1991).
Much of the literature that evaluates models of party influence on presidentialcongressional outcomes contrasts these hypothesized effects with those of competing
variables. This literature argues that the apparent effect of political parties is actually the
result of policy preferences of members. This literature concludes that it is the ideology
of congressmen that shapes legislative outcomes in terms of roll-call voting (Brady and
Volden 2006; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Epstein, Kristensen, and O'Halloran
Forthcoming; Krehbiel 1993; Krehbiel 1995; Krehbiel 1998; Krehbiel 1999; McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2001), the success of presidential nominees (Binder and Maltzman
2002; Shipan and Shannon 2003), and in terms of coalition formation (Krehbiel 1995;
Krehbiel 1999).
As noted above, political parties are at the heart of the divided government
literature, as most studies define divided government in terms of party control. However,
the effect of political parties can extend beyond simply controlling legislative chambers
and/or the presidency, particularly in terms of the strength of partisan control of the
legislature. As such, I seek to separate party control (simply controlling a majority) from
the effect of increasingly large (small) partisan majorities (deficits). This distinction is
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grounded in the scholarly literature, and there is still disagreement over whether the
strength of party seat allocations actually matters.
Party control and seat allocations are intimately related, as the president’s party
obviously holds more seats in the legislature during periods of unified party control than
it does during divided party control. In this regard, Epstein, Kristensen, and O’Halloran
(Forthcoming) note that “seat share is a more sensitive indicator of divided government.”
However, some scholars argue that the number (or percentage) of seats held by the
president’s party significantly affects presidential-congressional outcomes.
Light (1999) argues that, "party seats remain the gold standard for presidential agenda
setting. Short-term gains in presidential approval can make the influence of those seats more
liquid perhaps, but cannot convert a Republican seat into a Democratic seat unless than
approval creates a coattail in the next election." Similarly, Rudalevige (2002) asserts that,
"majority party presidents, quite simply, do better on the floor of Congress than do minority
party presidents; and the larger the majority, the better the president does." The conclusion is
that the size of a president’s seat advantage (or deficit) is an important component of the larger
phenomenon of divided government.
Bond and Fleisher (1990), in their work on presidential-congressional relations,
demonstrate the importance of seat allocations to presidential success in Congress.
However, rather than the raw number/percentage of seats held by the president’s party,
Bond and Fleisher examine the ideology of these members. They create four
classifications of members: the president’s base seats, cross-pressured members of the
president’s party, cross-pressured members of the opposition party, and the opposition
party’s base seats. The president can count on his base to consistently support his

24

agenda, and thus larger numbers of base members is advantageous. Likewise, a smaller
number of base seats for the opposition party leads to higher levels of presidential
success. The cross-pressured members are those whose ideology is closer to that of the
median member of the other political party, often simply classified as moderate partisans.
These majorities (presidential base seats, and cross-pressured members of the president’s
party) are typically larger during divided party control, and can significantly affect
presidential-congressional relations (Bond and Fleisher 1990).
While these scholars argue that the number (or percentage) of seats held by the
president’s party is important for legislative success, Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) do not
believe that every additional seat matters. They argue that “the most important increment to a
party’s coalition in Congress is the one that provides it the majority to organize a chamber.
Each additional vote after 50% plus one does not add an equal increment to the power of the
majority party.” Given this disagreement in the literature, it is important to examine whether
partisan seat allocations provide additional information about legislative outcomes, once
controlling for the effect of party control of a simple majority.
To better understand the relationship between divided government and legislative
outcomes, we need to determine the role that party plays in determining political
outcomes when controlling for the ideological component of the phenomenon.
Ideology
A second component of divided government is ideological distance between the
president and key members in Congress. Many scholars and pundits have assumed that
the president and Congress will typically share policy preferences during periods of
unified party control and have divergent preferences when divided party control exists.
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However, party control and ideological (dis)agreement are distinct, and do not
necessarily accompany one another. Given that these are separate components of the
larger phenomenon of divided government, we can examine the relative effect of party
and ideology, to see whether one component, both components, or neither component
drives legislative outcomes. Questions such as these about the effect of party and
ideology are not new to the literature on legislative outcomes. Rather, a great deal of
literature has examined the effect of policy preferences, with many concluding that
ideology plays a significant role in shaping legislative outcomes.
Recently, the effects of ideology on legislative outcomes have been explored in
the literature on “gridlock.” These studies, discussed above, examine the role of
preferences (both of presidents and key members of Congress) on various legislative
outcomes. This gridlock literature has remained largely separate from the divided
government literature, even though each addresses a separate component of the larger
divided government phenomenon. This dissertation seeks to reconcile these two
literatures, as they both help justify the expanded definition of divided government.
The gridlock literature, however, is not the only work on the effects of ideology.
As discussed in the previous section, much of this literature pits party against ideology,
attempting to determine which of these factors drives various congressional outcomes.
Some scholars assert that party drives legislative behavior, regardless of the preferences
of the members of these political parties (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Cox
and Poole 2002; Hager and Talbert 2000; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Strattman 2000).
Other scholars have taken exception to this claim, arguing that it is ideology that
determines how members will vote, how coalitions will form, how long the confirmation

26

process will take, as well as many other outcomes (Binder and Maltzman 2002; Bond and
Fleisher 1990; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Kingdon 1981; Krehbiel 1993; Krehbiel 2000;
Poole and Rosenthal 1997). The disagreement between these two camps persists, as the
literature has yet to reach consensus about the relative impact of party and ideology.
In addition to the work that has studied ideology and congressional behavior,
some recent research has incorporated measures of ideological distance between key
actors in the system. While Krehbiel’s (1998) preference-based rational choice model
discusses the relative position of “pivotal” players and the president, the model does not
account for the specific ideology scores of these actors. More recent work (Epstein,
Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming) has revised the Krehbiel model, determining
the ideological distance between the pivotal member that Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and
Volden (2006) posit. Epstein, et al. (Forthcoming) conclude that a larger gridlock
interval (i.e. a larger ideological distance between key actors in the presidentialcongressional relationship) does not significantly affect the level of policy stalemate in
Congress, challenging the conclusions of Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and Volden (2006).
Other scholars have incorporated ideological distance measures to study the confirmation
process of judicial nominees. Shipan and Shannon (2003) find that the ideological
distance between the president and the Senate determines both the success rate of
nominees and the duration of these confirmation proceedings. The further apart the
president and Senate are ideologically, the more likely the president’s nominees will be
stonewalled by the Senate. When, on the other hand, the president and Senate share
similar preferences, nominees are confirmed with much greater speed and success. These
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models are important, as they show that the relative ideology of different actors in the
political system may shape presidential-congressional outcomes.
More recent literature on roll-call voting, gridlock, and legislative productivity
has examined the effect of ideology in a slightly different light by focusing on the
polarization of political parties (Aldrich and Battista 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001;
Binder 1999; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Brady and Volden 2006; Jones, True, and
Baumgartner 1997; Jones 2001; McCarty and Razaghian 1999). Rather than looking at
the ideological distance between key actors, this literature considers the ideological
distance between the Democratic and Republican members of Congress. According to
these scholars, it is not the number of partisans that determine political outcomes, but
rather the ideology of these members. When parties are more moderate, and thus
ideologically proximate, we should expect more bipartisanship and compromise. This
should promote legislative productivity. However, when political parties are
ideologically divergent, finding common ground is exceedingly difficult. Under these
conditions, stalemate is much more likely. As with the other components of divided
government, there is variation in how well these hypotheses hold up empirically. Party
polarization appears to lead to policy gridlock (Binder 1999; Bond and Fleisher 2000;
Jones 2001), as well as lengthening the confirmation process for presidential nominees
(McCarty and Razaghian 1999). Given these findings, it would seem logical that
polarization would also lead to incrementalism, as divergent parties should keep sharp
policy changes in check. Jones, True, and Baumgartner (1997), however, do not find this
to be the case. Again, the findings in the literature are contradictory.
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Much of the literature does not separate the effect of congressional leadership on
the presidential-congressional relations from those of party described above. Given that
the majority party controls the chamber leadership positions, the preferences of these
leaders are entirely determined by party control. There are also reasons to expect these
leaders to affect presidential-congressional outcomes (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Chiou
and Rothenberg 2003; Jackson 1974; Kingdon 1981; Sinclair 1995).
The chamber leadership (such as the Speaker of the House, House and Senate
Majority/Minority Leaders, House and Senate Majority and Minority Whips) is able to
shape the behavior of their members throughout the legislative process (Bond and
Fleisher 1990; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Jackson 1974; Kingdon 1981; Sinclair 1995).
These leaders can relay preferences of the administration to members in the legislature,
affect the referral of legislation to particular committees, organize members to filibuster
or invoke cloture, cue voting behavior among partisans on the floor, and provide benefits
(punishments) for members who support (do not support) the party line (Bond and
Fleisher 1990; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Jackson 1974; Kingdon 1981; Sinclair 1995).
While it is clear that the president’s party holds the majority leadership positions during
unified party control and the opposition party does so during divided party control, the
ideology of these leaders vary widely (as will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3).
Presumably the preferences of the leaders are closer to those of the president during
unified party control and farther away during divided party control. It is unclear whether
the preferences of these leaders, relative to the rank-and-file and president, also affect
legislative outcomes. However, this is another empirical question that needs to be tested.
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In addition to these chamber leadership positions, those in control of
congressional committees are also important. The president’s party controls the
leadership of every congressional committee (and additionally control a majority of the
seats on every committee) during unified party control, while the opposition party
controls these positions in at least one legislative chamber during divided party control.
Despite party playing a role in determining the pool from which these leaders are
selected, it is possible to have a wide range of preferences represented by these chairmen.
Bond and Fleisher (1990) describe the power that committee chairman can have
on presidential-congressional outcomes, stating that “decisions of committee leaders to
support or oppose the president’s preferences on issues that come through their
committees are nonetheless a major determinant of success” (1990). Committee
chairmen help determine to which subcommittee legislation will be referred, whether
hearings will be held on particular issues, and whether legislation is referred from the
committee back to the floor of the chamber (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sinclair 1983;
Sinclair 1995; Smith and Deering 1984; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995). Given
the importance of committee chairmen in the legislative process, it is especially important
to include these key actors when examining presidential-congressional dependent
variables. These congressional leaders are included within the “ideology component” as
their preferences vary widely and may explain differences in behavior across chairmen
from the same political party.
Although these components have been included in previous research to some
extent, they generally are included separately rather than collected in the same research.
Yet all of these components together determine the amount of agreement between the
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president and Congress. In other words, it is the cumulative effect of these various
components that determines just how “divided” or “unified” government really is.

Conclusions
As discussed above, a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the topic of
divided government, examining whether this political phenomenon hampers presidentialcongressional relations. Divided government seems to affect some areas of presidentialcongressional relations adversely but not others. Despite copious discussion, the
literature has not come to a consensus about the effects of divided government, leaving us
unsure whether divided government is actually more deleterious for presidents than
unified government.
Although this phenomenon has received so much attention in the literature, divided
government has been defined narrowly in terms of party control of political institutions.
While may have assumed that divided party control is accompanied by a more adverse
relationship between the president and Congress, this has not been established
empirically. This research contends that party and preferences represent distinct
components of the larger phenomenon of divided government. Furthermore, despite the
wealth of research on divided government, no empirical work to date has examined
which component(s) of divided government are most likely to affect various political
outcomes. Perhaps some components of divided government affect the success/failure of
legislation, but not judicial nominations. Perhaps other components of divided
government affect the proclivity of presidents to veto legislation, or of committees to kill
legislation. Without developing models that can test the relative effects of different
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components of divided government, we will not truly understand how divided
government affects presidential-congressional relations.
Is it possible then that these seemingly contradictory findings on the effects of
divided government are the product of the narrow definition and measures most
commonly used to operationlize “divided government”? As a step towards addressing
this question, the next chapter offers measures of the components of divided government
that are consistent with the broader definition offered above. By creating distinct
variables to capture these different components, we can test their relative effect on
legislative outcomes.

Copyright © Jeffrey Allen Fine 2006
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Chapter 3
Measuring Adversity between Congress and the President
Key questions:
• How is divided government traditionally measured?
• What are the assumptions and limitations of the divided government dummy
variable?
• How can we operationalize the components of divided government?
Why Measurement Matters
As Chapter Two demonstrates, the literature examining the effects of divided
government is divided, with seemingly contradictory findings and theories that do not
fully explain a wide range of political outcomes. While some scholars have found no
significant difference between periods of unified and divided government, others have
found that the latter hinders presidential-congressional relations and legislative outcomes.
I argue that these contradictory findings may be the result, at least in part, of the measures
used to operationalize the phenomenon. More specifically, the failure of previous
scholars to incorporate measures that allow for the relative test of the components of
divided government may account for this divided literature.
Both the ideological and partisan components of divided government discussed in
the previous chapter may have an effect on legislative outcomes. However, the literature
has to date equated “divided government” with “divided party control.” Not only are
there reasons to believe that these components may shape presidential-congressional
relations, but there are also reasons to expect variation in these components over time.
Given both the seemingly contradictory findings and the dynamics of the components of
divided government, there is a need in the literature for measures that allow scholars to
distinguish “party control” for the broader concept of “divided government.” In this
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chapter, I discuss the various measures that will be used to test the impact of each
component on various legislative outcomes. By testing the relative effect of each of these
components on commonly examined dependent variables, I hope to reconcile the
seemingly contradictory findings on the effects of divided government.

Previous Measures of Divided Government
At first glance, divided government appears to be a rather simple concept to
operationalize. When the president of the United States is of one party and the other
party controls both chambers of Congress, divided government exists.7 Given the
apparent simplicity of measuring the phenomenon, the vast majority of scholars employ a
dummy variable to measure divided and unified government.8 Early work on divided
government (Mayhew 1991; Sundquist 1988) examined the phenomenon using this
dichotomous variable, with most subsequent researchers utilizing the same measure (Alt
and Lowry 1994; Binder 1999; Binder 2003; Binder and Maltzman 2002; Brady and
Volden 2006; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Jones 2001; Krehbiel 1998; Krutz
2001a; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998). Of the dozens of studies that tackle the causes
and effects of divided party control, relatively few scholars have quantified it using a

7

If one party controls the House while the other party controls the Senate, then
another form of divided government, sometimes called “mixed control,” exists. Most
studies, however, treat both forms of divided government in the same way. In the postWorld War II period, “mixed control” only occurred from 1981 to 1986, when the
Republican Party controlled the presidency (Reagan), the Senate, but not the House of
Representatives.
8
Studies that make a distinction between divided control and mixed control
typically operationalize divided government in the following way: Divided government =
1, Mixed control = .5, Unified government = 0.
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variable other than the dummy measure (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Conley 2003; Shipan
and Shannon 2003).
While the traditional divided government dummy variable seems straightforward,
it is not without problems. This dummy variable is loaded with assumptions that have
both methodological and theoretical implications.
Assumptions of the Dummy Variable
Although the use of a dummy variable to capture the presence or absence of
divided government appears to be a methodological choice, the decision to employ such a
measure is theoretically important as well. Not only has the literature defined “divided
government” as “divided party control,” but it has also operationalized divided
government strictly based on party control. Given that party control is only one
component of the larger divided government phenomenon, use of the dummy variable is
problematic in several meaningful ways.
The dummy variable (also referred in this dissertation as the “divided government
dummy variable”) makes two key assumptions, which have both methodological and
theoretical implications. The first assumption, as stated above, is that party control of the
presidency and legislature matters, as this variable takes on a value of 1 or 0 based only
on whether the party that controls the presidency also controls both chambers of
Congress. Implicitly, the dummy variable assumes that the other components discussed
in the previous chapter do not matter (e.g., ideology) – that it does not matter how much
the chief executive shares preferences with members of the two parties or with their most
influential members. Additionally, it assumes that party control, rather than the degree of
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party control (“party seats”) matters, as this measure cannot distinguish larger seat
majorities (deficits) from small ones.
The second assumption made by use of the dummy variable is that the nature of
divided government has remained constant. The use of a dummy variable assumes that
all periods of unified government and all periods of divided government are equal, as
they are assigned the same numeric value. In other words, when examining legislative
outcomes, the use of a dichotomous variable assumes that the effect of divided
government on these outcomes is the same during divided government in the 1990s as it
was during divided government in the 1950s. If, however, the components of divided
government have varied in a meaningful way, this assumption would be flawed.
Whether intentional or not, other scholars have made these assumptions through
their use of this measure. There are reasons to question both of these assumptions.
Challenging the Assumptions of the Divided Government Dummy
There are many reasons to question the assumptions made by the use of a
dichotomous measure to capture divided government. The justification for challenging
the assumption that only party control matters, rather than something else, is largely
provided in the previous chapter. Neither the ideology component of divided government
nor the seats dimension of the party component is captured by the dummy variable,
despite the theoretical reasons for believing that each affects legislative outcomes.
Which component of divided government (party, ideology, both, neither) drives
legislative outcomes is an empirical question, rather than a conclusion that has been well
established in the literature.
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There is a myriad of reasons to question the assumption that divided government
has not changed over time. There has been a great deal of variation in the components of
divided government over time. Again, if something other than party control matters, then
this variation should substantively affect legislative outcomes. It is possible that unified
government during the Eisenhower administration did not have the same impact on
legislative outcomes that it does today during the Bush administration, as the result of
variation in one (or both) of the components. Similarly, it is possible that, as these
components of divided government have varied over time, divided government has posed
more or less of a deleterious political environment.
Variation in Party Seat Allocations
In the post-World War II period there have been wide variations in the number of seats that
the president’s party held in both the House and the Senate. For example, during 1965-66
under Lyndon Johnson there were 68 Democratic senators and 295 House members from the
president’s party. In 2003 under George W. Bush there were 51 Republican senators and 229
Republican House members. Both governed during periods of unified party control, yet on the
basis of congressional seats held by the party of the president, Johnson was in a much more
commanding position than was Bush, who had slim majorities in both the House and the
Senate. While LBJ could afford to lose members of his own party and still achieve success on
his legislative agenda, George W. Bush could afford no defections. Hence, while both
presidents experienced unified party control, there were important variations in their ability to
influence Congress. Yet, a dummy variable treats each case as being the same.
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Variation in Ideology
Along with the variation in seat allocations over time, there has also been a great
deal of variation in the ideology of members of Congress and presidents in the postWorld War II period. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on party polarization (Aldrich and
Battista 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Binder 1999; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Brady and
Volden 2006; Jones, True, and Baumgartner 1997; Jones 2001; McCarty and Razaghian
1999), which argues that the average Democrat and the average Republican have become
ideologically more disparate in recent decades. The recent polarization of Democratic
and Republican members of Congress is likely the product of several factors. First, as
conservative Southern Democrats were retired from public life by gerrymandering, the
Democratic Party became more liberal (Lublin and Voss 2003). Second, Northern
Democrats become more liberal as well (Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002). This
polarization has left fewer moderates in Congress than there were in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s. Further polarization in the 1990s (Bond and Fleisher 2000) means that there
are also fewer cross-pressured legislatures with whom presidents from opposing parties
can bargain easily (Bond and Fleisher 1990).
The shifting preferences of congressmen became even more pronounced
following the 1980 elections. Not only did control of the Senate change from Democratic
control to Republican control for the first time since 1955, but the preferences of the
members also shifted. Brady and Volden (Brady and Volden 2006) describe these
changes:
The new Congress differed significantly from the 96th Congress. The Senate was
Republican for the first time in twenty-six years; liberal Senators including
George McGovern (D-SD), Birch Bayh (D-IN), Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), and
Frank Church (D-ID) had been defeated in 1980. They were replaced by
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conservative Senators like Dan Quayle (R-IN), Robert Kasten (R-WI), Steven
Symms (R-ID), Charles Grassley (R-IA), and James Abdnor (R-SD)….Both the
mean and the standard deviation show[ed] about a 40 percent drop from any
Senate scores over the 1969-1980 period….In addition to the Republican
majority, there were a sufficient number of conservative Democrats to ensure that
the filibuster could not be used often or effectively.
Thus, dramatic variation exists in the ideological preferences of members of Congress
over the last 50 years.
In addition to shifting ideology of members of Congress, the ideology of
presidents has also varied widely. Since World War II, the American people have elected
strong liberals (such as Kennedy and Clinton), strong conservatives (such as Reagan and
George W. Bush), as well as more moderate presidents from both political parties
(Eisenhower and LBJ)9. Table 3.1 presents presidential ideology (DW-Nominate scores)
over time.
- Table 3.1 about here When examining the varying effect of ideology on presidential-congressional outcomes,
however, one should consider not simply the raw scores of members of Congress and
presidents, but rather the relative ideological position of these actors over time.
Over the last 50 years, the ideological distance between the president and
Congress has also varied. Consider the differences between the political environment
Eisenhower confronted in 1958 and George W. Bush in 2002 (Poole 2003; Poole and
Rosenthal 1997). Under Eisenhower, the House and Senate were controlled by the
Democratic Party, many of whom were conservative Southern Democrats. Given that
Eisenhower was fairly moderate, the ideological distance between the president and
9

These classifications of presidential ideologies are based on Poole and
Rosenthal’s (1997; 2003) DW-Nominate scores. Negative scores are more liberal, and
high positive scores represent more conservative individuals.
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Congress was relatively small. George W. Bush faced a more contentious political
environment, with a majority of seats in the Senate held by the Democratic Party
following the defection of Jim Jeffords. As Bush is one of the most conservative
presidents ever, and as the Democrats that controlled the Senate were much more liberal
than was the Senate under Eisenhower, the ideological distance between the president
and the Senate was quite large. Consequently, as the preferences of both the president
and Congress have varied widely over the last 50 years, so too has the ideological gap
between the preferences of these actors.
Variation in the Correlation between Party and Ideology
Aside from variation in the ideology of members of Congress, the relationship
between party and ideology of congressmen has also changed over time. Figure 3.1
presents the correlation between party and ideology in the House of Representatives over
time, while Figure 3.2 presents the correlation between party and ideology in the
Senate10.
- Figures 3.1 and 3.2 about here As these figures show, partisanship and ideology were not as highly correlated in the
1950s and 1960s (81st through 91st Congresses). This is largely the result of the many
Democratic congressmen, many of whom were from southern states, who had fairly
conservative ideologies. However, over the last 25 years, the correlation between party
and ideology has strengthened as members of Congress have become more ideologically

10

These figures present the correlation (Pearson’s r) between a member’s
partisanship and his/her ideology, using Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate score
(Poole 2003; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).
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polarized (Poole 2003; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).

Table 3.2 presents the mean

correlation coefficient between party and ideology for each decade since 1950.
- Table 3.2 about here As the Democratic and Republican congressional delegations have polarized, the
party label has become more informative (Hager and Talbert 2000). In the 1950s and
1960s, knowing a members’ partisanship did not provide as much information about the
ideology of those members. Today, however, a member’s partisanship is more strongly
related to his/her ideology.
Variation in Chamber Leadership
In addition to changing preferences among the rank-and-file members of Congress over
time, there have also been shifts in the chamber leadership. Consider the effect that
replacement of more moderate legislators like Robert Dole and Robert Michel with more
ideological leaders like Trent Lott, Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey and Tom Delay had on politics
in Washington. A more nuanced measure that captures party change effects, including the
increasing ideological distance between the two parties’ leadership teams and the president is
better suited to this purpose.
Still, as Cox and McCubbins (1993) note, it is the party leadership that sets the political
agenda and determines the leadership of the congressional committees. A change from Tom
Foley to Newt Gingrich therefore could have a major impact on presidential relations with
Congress, even if there were only a modest corresponding shift in the ideology of the median
legislator.
Thus, the ideology of congressional leaders relative to the ideology of the rank-and-file
members of their party and to the president are meaningful when examining legislative
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outcomes. Additionally, the ideology of these leaders can vary widely as a result of electoral
and idiosyncratic factors.
Variation in Committee Leadership
As with the ideology of these other members, the preferences of committee
chairman have also varied widely in this time period. During the Kennedy
administration, many of the committee chairmen were Southern Democrats whose
preferences were far from those of the president. Contrast this situation with that faced
by Bill Clinton from 1993 to 1994. Although both presidents governed during periods of
unified party control, the committee chairmen during Clinton’s first two years were much
more liberal. As a result, the ideological distance between the president and these
members of Congress was much smaller. This example is demonstrative of a recent trend
in the preferences of committee chairmen.
Before the committee reforms of 1975, committee chairmen were selected based
on seniority. Following these reforms, both the Democratic and Republican parties were
freer to select committee chairmen that were more ideologically extreme. As with the
dramatic shift in preferences of the average member following the 1980 election, the
committee chairmen in the 97th Congress (1981-82) differed greatly from the chairmen
controlling the congressional committees in the 96th Congress (1979-80). Strong liberals
were replaced in the 97th Congress by much more conservative members (Brady and
Volden 2006). Both political parties have selected much more extreme committee
chairmen in recent years. As the committee chairmen shift from moderates to more
extreme members of the majority party, legislation may shift from the ideal point of the
median member of the legislature to a point closer to the preferred point of the committee
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chairman. If this is occurs, then a shift in the ideology of the committee chairmen may
affect legislative outcomes, even when no shift in the membership of the chamber has
occurred. As such, not only is there variation in this component of divided government,
but this variation is important in terms of legislative outcomes (Epstein and O'Halloran
1999).
Hence, while the vast majority of studies of divided government employ this
dummy variable, previous scholars have not tested the assumptions that are inherent to
this measure.
Other Problems with the Dummy Variable
Aside from issues related to the assumptions made by the dichotomous measure,
there also are serious problems with the use of a dummy variable to measure divided
government in the post-World War II time period. First, prior to Bill Clinton’s
presidency, all Democratic presidents since Harry Truman (Kennedy, Johnson and
Carter) governed during times of unified party control, while all of the Republican
presidents (Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush) governed during
periods of divided party control, most for a majority of their time in the White House.
Therefore, as Mayer (1999) asserts, “Simply testing for differences between presidents
under divided and unified [party control] is no different than testing for differences
between Democratic and Republican presidents…”. While the Clinton presidency now
provides us with a Democratic President and a Republican controlled Congress, and
George W. Bush a Republican president and a Republican Congress, the use of a dummy
variable to measure divided government in the pre-Clinton period may be picking up only
the difference between Democratic and Republican administrations.
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Measuring the Components of Divided Government
The inclusion of more nuanced and theoretically appropriate measures will allow
for the relative test between the components of divided government. Party control is the
easiest component to quantify, as the president’s party controls a legislative chamber or it
does not. I employ a dichotomous variable to capture party control, where the variable
takes on a value of 1 when the president’s party controls the legislative chamber and 0
when the president’s party does not control that chamber. Again, this dummy variable
capturing party control is operationalized in exactly the same way as the “divided
government dummy variable” that has been used in the majority of studies on this topic
to quantify “divided government.” This dissertation contributes to the literature by
expanding the definition of divided government to more accurately capture the level of
congruence or adversity between the president and Congress. In doing so, I will not use
dummy variables aside from the party control dummy variable, but rather continuous
measures that contain high levels of variation.
Measuring Party Seat Allocations
As discussed in Chapter Two, there are two dimensions to the party component of
divided government. In addition to simple party control, as discussed and operationalized
above, the strength of party control is also meaningful. This second dimension of the party
component is operationalized based on the percentage of each legislative chamber that is
controlled by the president’s party.
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It usually is not difficult to measure the party seat allocations in the House and
Senate11. The data on these breakdowns are readily available (Ragsdale 1996). As this
research examines presidential-congressional relations, I consider the percentage of seats
controlled by the president’s party and by the opposition party. More specifically, I examine
the percentage of seats held by the president’s party in both the House and the Senate: that is,
the percentage of seats held by the president’s party minus the percentage of seats held by the
opposition party. This variable takes on a positive value when the president’s party holds the
chamber majority and a negative value when the opposition holds the majority of seats. As
such, this provides a continuous measure of the party component, as opposed to the
dichotomous measure that typically has been used in the past. The percentage of seats held by
the president’s party in the House and Senate are presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
- Figures 3.3 and 3.4 about here Measuring Ideology and Leadership
Previous scholarship has operationalized ideology in a variety of ways. One
could include measures that capture the ideology of the median legislator in Congress
(Brady and Volden 2006; Shipan and Shannon 2003), the median member of the majority
party (Conley 2003), or the ideology of certain “pivotal” members of the system (Brady
and Volden 2006; Epstein, Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming; Krehbiel 1998).
These ideology scores could be included by themselves, or these variables could be
11

Measuring seat allocations can be more complicated at times, as it is possible
for the number of seats held by the president’s party to shift over a two-year period.
Members of Congress occasionally die in office, retire from public life, leave Congress to
seek a different political office, or are selected by the president to fill an executive branch
position. While these seats are vacant, or when someone from an opposing party replaces
these members, the allocations can change. Seat allocations can also change when a
member of Congress changes his/her party affiliation, as was the case when James
Jeffords (Vermont) defected from the Republican Party to an Independent affiliation.
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subtracted from the president’s ideology score to capture the ideological distance
between the president and these actors. As this research seeks to determine the level of
presidential-congressional adversity, it seems most appropriate to include measures of
ideological distance, so that we have a variable that quantifies the level of harmony or
discord between the policy preferences of the president and Congress12.
While these ideology measures capture the ideological distance between the
president and Congress, and how this distance varies over time, they are not without
limitations. Using the median member of the majority party as the “key” actor, like the
divided government dummy variable, assumes that party control matters. As the aim of
these measures is to avoid making the assumptions of the divided government dummy
variable, using the median member of the majority party is problematic. Another
problem endemic to several of these ideology members is that they do not vary within
congressional sessions. Although the distance between the president and these key actors
vary over time, they rarely vary within a two-year period13. In this research, I include the
ideological distance between the president and the median legislator in some models.

12

This research uses the absolute distance because we do not care whether
Congress is more conservative or liberal than the president, only that its ideology is
different from it. That is, I do not hypothesize that presidents that are far more liberal
than members of Congress are more or less disadvantaged than those who are more
conservative than members of Congress, though this may in fact be an interesting
question for further research.
13
It is possible to construct a model based on the Krehbiel “pivotal politics”
model that would vary based on the specific issue area. To do so, one would need to sort
members on more than just the traditional one dimension of preferences used to calculate
ideology. If the median legislator, the veto pivot, and the filibuster pivot were allowed to
vary based on the content of the specific legislation, these measures would vary both
across congressional sessions and within sessions. This would strengthen their
applicability to different studies and data sets.
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Measuring chamber leadership and committee leadership is more complicated.
One possibility would be to include measures that capture the power of the chamber
leadership and committee chairmen. However, the powers of these have not varied much
over the last 50 years14. These leaders have varied in terms of their policy preferences,
especially when compared to the preferences of other political actors. As with the
previous measures that capture the ideological distance between key actors and the
president, the same can be done with the chamber leadership and committee chairmen.
Figure 3.5 presents the ideological distance between the president and the Speaker of the
House, and Figure 3.6 presents the ideological distance between the president and the
Senate Majority Leader. Similarly, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 display the distance between the
president and the average chairmen of the standing committees in the House and the
Senate15.
- Figures 3.5 through 3.8 about here While each of these measures is incorporated into some of the models, I focus on the
distance between the president and committee chairmen. These committee chairmen are
critical actors in the system. Almost all legislation is referred to committee, and the vast
majority of this legislation fails at this stage of the legislative process. Thus, the
ideological distance between these actors and the president are expected to affect
legislative outcomes. Chapter 5 examines several recent examples in much more detail,
14

While the powers themselves have not changed greatly, the use of these powers
by the leadership has varied more widely. This variation is likely the product of
leadership preferences, rather than what is driving leadership behavior.
15
As new standing committees are created, old ones are abolished, or in some
cases names are changed or committees are consolidated, the total number of standing
committees across Congresses often changes. I examine the chairs of all of the standing
committees in the Senate and the House. Names of the committee chairs and leaders were
derived from the Congressional Directory for each Congress in the data set.
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illuminating the expected impact of committee chairmen ideology on outcomes.
Additionally, use of the committee chairmen scores allows for theoretically driven
variation within each congressional session, as each piece of legislation can be tied to
specific committees and their respective chairs. As with some of the other ideological
distance measures, the chamber leadership does not vary within a congressional session.
Given that the intention here is to explain variation both across legislative sessions and
within legislative sessions across issue areas, the committee chairmen are the more
appropriate congressional actors to include in the present analyses.
Over the course of the post-WWII time period, the distance measures are consistent
with prior expectations regarding divided government: there is usually greater ideological
distance between the president and the committee chairs in times of divided party control than
there is in periods of unified party control. However, there is also a great deal of variation in
these measures, both during periods of unified and divided party control. These variables allow
for examination of the effect of this variation on legislative outcomes. A perusal of Figures 3.7
and 3.8 shows that the ideological difference between the president and the committee chairs
has increased considerably over time. When Kennedy became president in 1961, representing
a shift from divided to unified party control, there was relatively little change in the ideological
distance between the president and the average committee chair in Congress16. Rather than
decreasing, as one would expect, the distance actually increased slightly from .22 (Eisenhower
and the 86th Congress) to .24 (Kennedy and the 87th Congress). The explanation is that
conservative Southern Democrats largely controlled the leadership of Congress and its
committees. Hence, while Kennedy was operating in a period of unified government, the

16

This ideological distance will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.
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ideological adversity that he faced was similar to that of his Republican predecessor. The next
shift to divided party control occurred with Nixon in 1969. Here the shift was larger, from .05
(Lyndon Johnson and the 90th Congress) to .38 (Nixon and the 91st Congress). With the move
to unified party control following Carter’s election in 1976, we witnessed a similar shift (from
.34 to .09). With the arrival of Ronald Reagan in 1981, however, the magnitude of the shift
increased dramatically. The ideological distance between Carter and the average committee
chairs in the 96th Congress was only .03, while for Reagan and the 97th Congress it was .8517.
The transition from George H. W. Bush to Clinton in 1993 (.81 to .02) was accompanied by a
shift similar to 1981. Likewise, the Republican takeover in the 104th Congress in 1995
increased the ideological distance for Clinton from (.02 to .77).
Again, these new measures of ideological adversity contain a great deal of variation
over time, raising the possibility that the partisan and ideological components of divided
government pose a worse political environment today than they did earlier in the 20th century.
The variation in these components, along with different scholars examining different segments
of this longer time period, may help explain some of the contradictory findings that dominate
the divided government literature.

Examining Aggregate-Level Dependent Variables
These measures of adversity - by way of the components of divided government are relatively straightforward when examining outcomes that only involve one legislative
chamber. Several presidential-congressional variables are specific to one legislative
chamber. In the Senate, this includes the duration and outcome of presidential nominees
17

This shift is consistent with the changes noted by Brady and Volden (2006)
about the changes linked to the 1980 election.
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for executive and judicial branch vacancies, treaties, and the outcome of legislation in the
Senate (including legislative failure via filibuster). Although the House does not play a
role in the confirmation process for nominees or treaties, examining whether legislation
successfully makes it though the House would be another example of single-chamber
outcomes.
For these single-chamber variables, measures of the components of divided
government can be used. When, for example, a researcher is examining the confirmation
process for judicial nominees, s/he can employ measures of party control, party seat
allocations, chamber leadership, and committee leadership in the Senate. However,
measuring presidential-congressional adversity is much more difficult when examining
outcomes that span both legislative chambers.
The problem in dealing with dual-chamber outcomes is in reconciling the
differences between the two chambers. Krehbiel (1998) circumvents the problems
associated with a two-chamber system by developing a rational choice model of
presidential-congressional interaction using a hypothetical unicameral legislature. While
this parsimonious model allows Krehbiel to avoid pitfalls associated with bicameral
differences, it is obviously unrealistic in the American context (Chiou and Rothenberg
2003; Epstein, Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming).18 As such, Krehbiel overcomes
the problem of a bicameral system without solving the problem itself. How, then, can
scholars deal with the American bicameral system without simply imposing an artificial
unicameral legislature?

18

The national legislature, as well as nearly all of the state legislatures, is
bicameral. The Nebraska state legislature is the lone exception in the American context.
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One solution would be to take the average value of the two chambers for each
variable of interest. However, as Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) note, “there is no clear
manner of averaging percentages of party majorities in each house, especially in 1981-1986
when different parties were in the majority of each house.” To average across chambers creates
an atheoretical measure that does not adequately reflect seat allocations in either chamber, let
alone the entire Congress. A second solution to this problem is to only use the values for either
the House or the Senate, but not both. However, only including values for one chamber
without a reason to do so is also atheoretical.
Measures of “Greater Adversity”
In this research, I overcome this difficult methodological hurdle by making a
theoretically driven choice between the values of two legislative chambers. Given that this
research examines legislative outcomes, many of which must successfully pass in both the
House and the Senate, one solution is to examine the chamber that poses the greater obstacle to
presidential-congressional relations. If the “more adverse” chamber still does not present a
deleterious environment for presidential-congressional relations, the legislative process should
run relatively smoothly. When, however, one legislative chamber is highly averse to working
with the president, we should expect high levels of gridlock and low levels of legislative
productivity.
During the Reagan administration, concerns about the filibuster aside, the House of
Representatives had the greater potential to block legislation that the president supported from
1981-1986, particularly since Democratic controlled committees could block legislation from
ever reaching the House floor. On the other hand, following the defection of Senator James
Jeffords to the Democratic Party in 2001, George W. Bush had a greater political affinity with
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his partisans in the House than he did with the Senate. This is not to say that the Senate under
Reagan or the House under Bush posed no obstacles to the president’s agenda. However, these
chambers were likely more favorable for presidential-congressional relations. Therefore, I
conceptualize the two chambers in terms of their potential opposition to the president’s
program; that is, which chamber is likely to provide the greater impediment to the president.
These measures are referred to as the Greater Adversity measures, for each of the components
of divided government included in the models.
Party Control
Measuring party control in aggregate models is straightforward, as the president’s
party either controls both chambers of Congress or it does not. Here, the dummy variable
that is traditionally used to measure divided government is actually appropriate. This
variable takes on a value of 1 when the president’s party controls both chambers of
Congress (i.e. unified government) and a value of 0 when the opposition party controls at
least one chamber of the legislature. One could also use a measure that allows for
“mixed control,” where the president’s party controls one, but not both, legislative
chamber.
Party Seat Allocations
To measure seat allocations for legislative outcomes that span both chambers, a
Greater Adversity Seats Measure can be created. To do so, I select the chamber (House or
Senate) where the opposition party holds a greater percentage of seats to develop a measure of
greater seats adversity, a measure of the chamber that represents the greater impediment to the
president for each session of Congress. Figure 3.9 presents a graph of this measure.
- Figure 3.9 about here -
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Not surprisingly, the data show that presidents who govern during divided government must
deal with a larger number of members of the opposition party (at least in one of the
congressional chambers). While the measure thus provides a certain degree of face validity,
there are limitations to this measure. There is still some measurement error, since it is more
difficult to pick up the votes of one percent of House seats (4.35 House members) than it is to
convince one percent of Senators (one Senator) to switch their vote. Thus, even a slightly
higher percentage of seats in the Senate may not represent as much of a threat to presidential
success as a smaller seat percentage in the House. While this certainly introduces measurement
error, its greatest impact will be in those cases where the House and Senate seat allocations are
nearly evenly split between the two parties.
It is also possible that the threat to presidential-congressional relations does not
manifest itself through seat allocations, but rather vis-à-vis the minority party’s use of the
filibuster in the Senate. If the House of Representatives is identified as the more adverse
chamber by the Greater Adversity Seats Measure, as it was during the Reagan
administration, there may still be instances where the president and the Senate are at odds
with one another. For example, if the Democrats in the Senate filibustered legislation
that the president supported, then the House may not be the most adverse chamber. In
this event, the “greater adversity” measure would be a conservative measure of
presidential-congressional discord.
Ideology and Leadership
As with the measure of seat allocations, the Greater Adversity Ideology measures are
conceptualized as the ideological distance between the president and members of Congress in
terms of the chamber that represents the greater impediment to presidential-congressional
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relations. From this perspective, the greater the ideological distance in one chamber, the less
amenable it should be to successful work between these actors. In developing these measures, I
include measures of the ideological distance between the president and three of the actors
described above: (1) the median legislator, (2) the chamber leadership, and (3) the committee
chairmen19. Increased ideological distance between any of these leaders and the president
should negatively impact presidential-congressional relations. Figures 3.10-3.12 present the
various Greater Adversity Ideology Measures.
- Figures 3.10 through 3.12 about here Measures of “Lesser Resistance”
Selecting the chamber that presents the most adverse political environment for the
president and Congress is not the only option. Alternatively, one could select the legislative
chamber that presents the smallest amount of adversity between these actors. As any
legislation must pass through both chambers for success, considering the chamber that poses
the “lesser resistance” to presidential-congressional relations serves as the lowest threshold that
must be cleared for any chance of passage. When the distance between the president and
Congress is small in the “lesser resistant” chamber, productivity should have a much higher
likelihood than when the lesser resistant chamber still poses an adverse political environment.
This represents the cases where presidents have the greater opportunity for legislative success.
In addition to having the greater opportunity for passage of favorable legislation, the “lesser
resistance” chamber also represents the body in which the president has the greater ability to

19

In models that examine aggregate-level outcomes (Chapter 4), the Greater
Adversity Ideology measure captures the distance between the president and the average
chairmen of the standing committees in that chamber. In models that examine individuallevel outcomes (Chapter 5), the Greater Adversity Ideology measure incorporates the
ideology of the chairman of the referring committee(s).
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block legislation that he does not endorse. It is also possible that achieving legislative success
in one chamber may put additional pressure on the other one to act.
These measures are constructed in a similar fashion to the Greater Adversity measures
described above. First, the chamber in which the president’s party contains the largest
percentage of seats is used to calculate the Lesser Resistance Seats measure. If the president’s
party does not have a majority of seats in either legislative chamber, this ideological distance
will be larger, making presidential-congressional relations more difficult. The Lesser
Resistance Ideology measures are created by determining the legislative chamber in which the
ideological distance between the president and Congress is the smallest for that time period.
Figure 3.13 presents the Lesser Resistance Seats Measure, and Figures 3.14-3.16 present the
Lesser Resistance Ideology Measures.
- Figures 3.13 through 3.16 about here By employing either the Greater Adversity or Lesser Resistance measures, I can
examine the relative effect of the components of divided government on legislative outcomes.

Conclusions
Almost all of the previous studies of divided government (both as an independent
and as a dependent variable) have defined the phenomenon as simply a function of party
control. As a result, the literature has tended to examine the phenomenon using a
dichotomous variable. This dummy variable takes on a value of “1” when divided party
control exists, and “0” when unified party control exists. While the choice of measures
appears to be only a methodological one, it also has theoretical implications. The use of a
dichotomous variable makes two key assumptions about divided government. First, it
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assumes that party control, rather than the other components of divided government, is
driving results. There is a wealth of literature that asserts that the strength of the party
majority and the ideology of key members of Congress may affect legislative outcomes,
suggesting that this assumption needs further examination. The second assumption of the
divided government dummy variable is that the effects of divided government have been
consistent over time (i.e. all periods of unified government and all periods of divided
government are the same). If this assumption is correct, then the effects of divided
government on legislative outcomes in the 1950s should be the same as the effect of
divided government on outcomes in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet, the components of
divided government have varied widely over the last 50 years, raising concerns over this
second assumption. This, too, is an empirical question that should be tested.
By incorporating measures of the components of divided government, rather than
a measure that only captures party control, I seek to test these assumptions to see whether
divided government truly poses a more deleterious political environment for presidentialcongressional relations. These measures allow for the relative test of the components of
divided government, overcoming both the methodological and theoretical limitations
inherent in this vast literature.
Additionally, the Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance measures allow for the
examination of the components of divided government and outcomes involving both a
single legislative chamber and both legislative chambers. I first employ these measures
in models that analyze aggregate-level legislative outcomes (Chapter 4). I then examine
the effect of the components of divided government on individual roll-call votes (Chapter
5).
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TABLES AND FIGURES: CHAPTER 3
TABLES:
TABLE 3.1: PRESIDENTIAL IDEOLOGY (DW-NOMINATE
SCORES)
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
H.W. Bush
Clinton
W. Bush

0.318
-0.547
-0.314
0.454
0.349
-0.475
0.564
0.463
-0.475
0.562
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TABLE 3.2: AVERAGE PARTY-IDEOLOGY CORRELATION BY DECADE
Decade
House
Senate
1950s
.7582
.6865
1960s
.7936
.7192
1970s
.7991
.7421
1980s
.8567
.8446
1990s
.8869
.9001
2000s
.9092
.8423
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FIGURES:
FIGURE 3.1: PARTY / IDEOLOGY CORRELATION - HOUSE (DW-NOMINATE)

Party-Ideology Correlation
House of Representatives
1949-2004
cong
90

100

110

P a rty-Id e o lo g y C o rre la tio n
0

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1

80

80

90

100
cong

59

110

Party
Ideology
Correlation
Presence of
Divided
Government

FIGURE 3.2: PARTY / IDEOLOGY CORRELATION - SENATE (DW-NOMINATE)
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FIGURE 3.3: PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD BY PRESIDENT’S PARTY - HOUSE
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FIGURE 3.4: PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD BY PRESIDENT’S PARTY - SENATE
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FIGURE 3.5: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE
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FIGURE 3.6: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND SENATE MAJORITY
LEADER
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FIGURE 3.7: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND COMMITTEE
CHAIRMEN - HOUSE
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FIGURE 3.8: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND COMMITTEE
CHAIRMEN - SENATE
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FIGURE 3.9: GREATER ADVERSITY SEATS MEASURE
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FIGURE 3.10: GREATER ADVERSITY IDEOLOGY MEASURE – MEDIAN MEMBER

Presidential-Congressional Adversity
Divided Government and Adversity
1949-2000
107

0

Level of Adversity

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1

81

80

90

100

110

Congress

68

Ideological
Distance
Adversity
Presence of
Divided
Government

FIGURE 3.11: GREATER ADVERSITY IDEOLOGY MEASURE – CHAMBER LEADERSHIP
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FIGURE 3.12: GREATER ADVERSITY IDEOLOGY MEASURE – COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
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FIGURE 3.13: LESSER RESISTANCE SEATS MEASURE

Least Resistance Seats Measure
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FIGURE 3.14: LESSER RESISTANCE IDEOLOGY MEASURE – MEDIAN MEMBER
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FIGURE 3.15: LESSER RESISTANCE IDEOLOGY MEASURE – CHAMBER LEADERSHIP
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FIGURE 3.16: LESSER RESISTANCE IDEOLOGY MEASURE – COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
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Chapter 4
The Effects of Adversity: Aggregate Models of Legislative Outcomes
(1945-2002)
Key questions:
• What effect do the components of divided government have on aggregate-level
legislative outcomes?
• Do the results of aggregate-level models support the assumptions made by the
traditional dummy variable used in most divided government studies?
As discussed in Chapter Two, the political science literature has yet to reach a
consensus about the effects of divided government. While there is empirical evidence
that divided government hampers presidential-congressional relations (Binder 1999;
Binder 2003; Cutler 1988; Edwards 1976; Sundquist 1988), there is also much support to
the contrary (Jones 1994; Mayhew 1991). It is possible that the seemingly contradictory
findings are the result of the way in which divided government is defined and measured.
The dichotomous variable typically employed in the literature fails to account for the
various components of divided government, and assumes that the phenomenon of divided
government has remained constant over time. Chapter Three discussed the limitations of
the traditional definition and measure of divided government, and offered ways to
operationalize the components of divided government.
In this chapter, I avoid making the assumptions that plague the literature on
divided government by examining the effect of the components of divided government on
legislative outcomes. Additionally, I consider whether divided government creates a
similar political environment today as it did earlier in the post-World War II period. To
test the effect of the components of divided government on legislative outcomes, I
employ three dependent variables that have been used in seminal studies of presidentialcongressional relations: presidential success in Congress, the amount of significant
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legislation that is enacted by Congress, and the amount of legislation that fails in
Congress. The presidential success rate models are derived from Bond and Fleisher’s
book The President in the Legislative Arena (1990), the amount of significant legislation
that Congress enacts re-examines Mayhew’s (1991) study, and the amount of failed
legislation is based on the work of Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997).20
Each of these three dependent variables will be examined at the aggregate-level,
with the two-year Congress serving as the unit of analysis. Additionally, each of these
variables considers outcomes that span both legislative chambers, looking at the entire
Congress together rather than the House and Senate separately. Given this unit of
analysis, and the fact that these models combine the outcomes of the House and Senate
into a single measure, I employ the Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance measures
introduced in the previous chapter.
For each of the three dependent variables, I run four OLS regression models. The
first model examines the bivariate relationship between the traditional divided
government dummy variable and the dependent variable. While I do not fully replicate
the original model offered by each of these previous studies, the effect of divided party
control (which they call “divided government”) on the dependent variable should be
consistent with previous findings. The second model seeks to test whether the effects of
divided party control on the dependent variable have been consistent over time. To

20

Given that I am replicating these studies, with some adjustments, the unit of
analysis and number of observations small (under 30) in each model. Some of the
original models in these books have even fewer observations, as they were published in
the early 1990s. The authors have continued to collect these data, and made them
available for download online. This allows me to re-examine their dependent variables
over a slightly expanded time period. Additionally, I have run diagnostics for each model
to ensure that the results are not skewed by the presence of outliers in these limited data.
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illustrate the possible shift over time, I break the traditional dummy variable into two
separate dummy variables. The reason for replacing one dummy variable with two
dummy variables is it allows an examination of potential changes in the effects of divided
government over time. The third model includes the Greater Adversity Ideology and
Greater Adversity Seats measures, as well as several control variables. The fourth model
substitutes the Lesser Resistance Ideology and Lesser Resistance Seats measures, also
including the control variables.
Control Variables
In each model, I include a series of control variables that previous scholars have found
to impact presidential-congressional outcomes: presidential approval rating, the national
budgetary situation, and bicameral differences. The effect of presidential approval ratings on
congressional voting with the president was examined in numerous studies (Brace and
Hinckley 1991; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Edwards 1989; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and
Rose 1985). These studies found that the presidential approval rating impacts roll-call voting
with the president, if only at the margins (Edwards 1989). Given that the unit of analysis for
the three dependent variables examined in the chapter is at the level of each Congress, I include
the mean presidential approval rating over the two-year period.
Several important works have controlled for the national budgetary situation. Most
notably, Mayhew (1991) and Binder (2003) included measures of the national budgetary
situation in their models, arguing that a more favorable budgetary situation may positively
affect presidential success rates. While both the Mayhew variable and the Binder variable are
similar, I use Binder’s budgetary situation variable as it extends throughout the course of the
entire time period of this research.
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Lastly, I include Binder’s (2003) measure of bicameral differences. Binder argues that
when disagreement between the House and the Senate is high, we should expect higher levels
of gridlock. This measure captures differences or agreement between the House and the Senate
by examining voting behavior in conference report votes. This variable takes on a high value
when members of the House and Senate do not vote in the same direction on a conference
report, and a low value when the two chambers are in agreement. In examining the
presidential-congressional relationship and its effect on legislative outcomes, it is especially
important to control for disagreement that arises within Congress itself. As the approval of both
chambers is necessary for legislative outcomes, divergent policy preferences may shape each of
the three dependent variables examined here. This inter-chamber disagreement would hinder
legislative productivity without being the product of the presidential-congressional dynamic.
For that reason, bicameral differences is an important control in the present research.
This discussion of control variables has two notable omissions: Mayhew’s (1991)
variables capturing the “start of term” and “activist mood” periods. Many scholars who
re-examined the conclusions of Mayhew fully replicated his models, including each of
his variables (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997). However, there is considerable
theoretical justification for excluding these variables. The start of term dummy variable
is supposed to capture a honeymoon effect, as we should expect higher legislative success
at the beginning of a president’s term. Higher presidential success during the first two
years of a president’s term than during the last two years is largely the product of seat
allocations. As the president’s party has, with rare exceptions, lost seats in Congress
during the midterm election, much of this start of term effect may be captured by the
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seats measures21. The second variable, Mayhew’s “activist mood” measure, is more
problematic. Mayhew included this measure to capture a period where a substantially
higher amount of legislation passed in Congress (Mayhew 1991). As Epstein,
Kristensen, and O’Halloran (Forthcoming) note, this “the activist mode variable seems to
be arbitrarily defined by the empirical surge in legislation in the 1960’s and in the first
half of the 1970’s. Since the variable lacks a theoretical foundation it seems somewhat
problematic to rely on model specifications that include it.” In other words, this variable
explains variation, but is not theoretically driven. For this reason, I do not include this
atheorical measure in the subsequent models.
Pre-1981 & Post-1981 Dummy Variables
In addition to the main explanatory variables and the control variables, I also
include two other variables (in Model 2, as stated above): a pre-1981 divided party
control dummy variable and a post-1981 divided party control dummy variable22. Again,
this party control dummy variable has, in previous scholarship, been used to quantify
“divided government.” These variables are included in Model 2 for each of the
dependent variables, in lieu of the traditional divided government dummy variable.
These two dummy variables are included to illustrate whether the effects of party control has
been consistent in the pre-1981 and post-1981 period. If in the models one of these two
dummy variables is significant, while the other is not, then the effect of divided party control
has varied over the course of the 1945 to 2002 time period. Given that previous scholars have
21

The models were also run with a “start of term” dummy variable included. The
substantive results do not change when this variable is omitted.
22
The pre-1981 variable is coded “1” in periods of divided party control before
1981, and “0” during unified party control as well as periods of divided party control that
occur from 1981-2000. The post-1981 dummy is coded in a similar fashion, coded as a
“1” only in post-1981 periods of divided party control.
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examined different time periods, it is possible that their findings and conclusions are time
contingent.
These two dummy variables are broken at 1981 for several reasons. First, much has
been written about the shift that occurred following the 1980 presidential and congressional
elections. As discussed in Chapter 3, 1981 marked a sharp change in the ideology of the
president, the ideology of Congress as a whole, and the ideology of committee chairmen
(Brady and Volden 2006). The 1980 election also resulted in the first Republican-held Senate
since the Eisenhower administration. Additionally, the 97th Congress marked the first full
period of divided party control following the committee reforms of 1975, allowing committee
chairmen to be selected by party caucuses rather than by seniority. Finally, the 1981 breakpoint
conveniently divides the post-World War II period nearly in half.

Presidential Success with Congress
The first set of models examines presidential success rates in Congress from
1953-1996. This is measured as the average presidential success rate for Congress:
(Success rate in the House + success rate in the Senate)/2.23 To determine the success
rate for the president in each chamber, one must first identify roll-call votes on which the
president has a stated position. The success rate is then calculated by dividing the
number of roll-calls that the president receives his preferred outcome by the total number
23

The dependent variable averages the value for the House and the Senate. I use
this combined dependent variable, rather than running separate models for the House and
Senate, as it is most comparable with the other dependent variables examined in this
chapter. The other two dependent variables, the number of major legislative enactments
and the number of legislative failures, deal with outcomes that span both chambers.
Thus, to evaluate the results of separate House and Senate models with respect to the
other two models, which examine outcomes that span both bodies, would be more
difficult.
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of votes on which s/he has a stated position24. Bond and Fleisher (1990) provide a
thorough justification of this measure, and why it is superior to others (such as
“presidential box scores”).
In their book, Bond and Fleisher (1990) conclude that presidential success is
significantly hampered by the presence of divided government. According to this
seminal study, when the president does not have a majority of seats in both chambers of
Congress (referred to as “minority presidents”), his success rate drops significantly. In
addition to the traditional divided party control dummy variable, Bond and Fleisher
(1990) also include a measure that combines both party seats and ideology. They break
members of Congress into four camps: the president’s base (those who vote with the
president’s party a majority of the time), cross-pressured members of the president’s
party (those that vote more with the majority of the opposition party than with the
president’s party), cross-pressured members of the opposition party (those that vote more
with the majority of the president’s party than with the opposition party), and the
opposition party’s base (those that vote with the opposition party a majority of the time).
As the voting behavior of these members manifests itself in the Poole and Rosenthal DWNominate scores, these seat allocations are essentially constructed based on ideology. As
the president has a larger base, s/he likely has a larger group of members that are
ideologically proximal. When Congress is comprised of a larger portion of crosspressured members, there are likely more moderates (more conservative Democrats, and
more liberal Republicans). A large opposition base presents the president with the largest

24

This variable is a percentage, on a 0 to 1 scale. The values of this variable
range from .455 (100th Congress) to .875 (88th Congress).
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impediment to success in Congress, likely facing a legislature that is further ideologically
from his/her own position.
Building on this work, I employ OLS regression to re-examine the Bond and
Fleisher data, which they have extended through 1996.25 I first examine the bivariate
relationship between divided party control and presidential success rate, then consider
whether the effect of divided party control on this dependent variable has been consistent
over time, and finally expand the model to include both components of divided
government. I replicate the work of Bond & Fleisher (1990), though I substitute my seats
and ideology for the Bond and Fleisher seats measure. Given that party seats and
ideology are theoretically distinct components, I prefer separate measures so that the
relative effects can be better understood. With respect to these models, I present 7
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Divided Party Control Dummy – In the bivariate models, I expect a
negative relationship between the divided party control dummy variable and
presidential concurrence rates.
Hypothesis 1b: Divided Party Control Dummy – In the multivariate models, I do not
expect to find a significant relationship between divided party control and the
dependent variable when I control for seats and ideology.
Hypothesis 2: Pre-1981 and Post-1981 Divided Party Control Dummy Variables –
The effects of divided party control have not been constant over time. Because of the
more hostile political environment in Washington today (see (Brady and Volden 2006;
Kernell 1986)), I expect to find that there is no significant relationship between pre25

These data were updated by the author, and obtained via Richard Fleisher’s web
site (http://www.fordham.edu/politicalsci/profs/fleisher/richfleisher.html).
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1981 divided party control and the dependent variable. I expect to find a negative
relationship between post-1981 divided party control and presidential success in
Congress. If party control only exerts a significant influence on the dependent variable
during one time period, then the effect of divided party control has not been constant
over time.
Hypothesis 3: Greater Adversity Party Seats – Seats adversity will negatively affect
presidential success in Congress. As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit (in
the chamber with the largest seat deficit), his overall success rate in Congress should
decrease.
Hypothesis 4: Greater Adversity Ideology - Ideological adversity will
negatively affect presidential success in Congress. As the distance between the
preferences of the president and committee chairmen increases, the president’s
success rate should decrease.
Hypothesis 5: Lesser Resistance Party Seats – Seats adversity will negatively affect
presidential success in Congress. As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit (in
the chamber where he has the most seats), his overall success rate in Congress should
decrease.
Hypothesis 6: Lesser Resistance Ideology – Ideological adversity will negatively
affect presidential success in Congress. As the distance between the preferences of
the president and committee chairmen increases, the president’s success rate
should decrease.
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Hypothesis 7: Presidential Approval Rating – Presidential approval will positively
affect presidential success in Congress. Higher levels of presidential approval should
increase legislative success, even if only “at the margins.”
The results of these models are presented in Table 1. The success rate is similar to a measure
used by Bond and Fleisher (1990; 1994; also see Ragsdale 1998: 390-91). The data cover the
years 1949-2000 or the 81st through the 106th Congresses26.
-Table 4.1 about here –
Model 1 examines the bivariate relationship between the divided party control dummy
variable and presidential success. The results confirm conventional wisdom (and H1a), as
divided party control significantly decreases the president’s success rate in Congress. Model 2
examines whether the effects of divided party control on presidential success rates have been
constant over time. To test the hypothesis that the effects of divided party control changed over
time (H2), Model 2 breaks the divided party control dummy variable into two periods, from
1949-1980 and 1981-2000 onward (the period in which the greatest level of ideological
polarization emerges). The results show that divided government exerts a significant effect on
presidential success in both periods (although the coefficient is larger – more negative – in the
post-1981 era). This indicates that presidential success is significantly lower during periods of
divided party control in both the pre-1981 and post-1981 time periods. This suggests that the
findings of studies examining presidential success in a smaller time period (such as Bond and
Fleisher’s work, which ends in 1990) are not time contingent.
26

The data for 1963 reflect the distance scores for John F. Kennedy, as his
assassination occurred in late November. Thus, the distance scores for the 88th Congress
are the average scores for Kennedy in 1963 and Johnson in 1964. The data for 1974
reflect the average scores for Nixon and Ford, as Nixon’s resignation occurred in the
middle of the year. Thus, the distance scores for the 93rd Congress are the average of
Nixon’s 1973 scores and the combined Nixon/Ford scores of 1974.
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Model 3 examines the effect of the Greater Adversity (GA) measures. As hypothesized
(H4) ideological adversity is negatively and significantly related to presidential success. As the
ideological distance between the president and the committee chairmen increases, his chances
of success in Congress drop. On average, a one standard deviation increase in ideological
adversity would lead to a 4.2% decrease in presidential success in Congress. Surprisingly, with
respect to H3, party seat allocations do not significantly affect success rates in the GA model.
When the president’s party controls a larger percentage of the seats, his success rate does not
increase. There are two possible interpretations of this result. First, it may be the product of the
way in which the dependent variable is constructed, as it averages the success rates across the
House and Senate. Thus, the president does not need to have to have a large seat majority in
both chambers for his concurrence rate to increase. Rather, s/he can have a high success rate in
one chamber, despite a more adverse situation in the other chamber. In other words, the
president can face an increasingly large deficit in one chamber, yet still have a similar success
rate overall (or perhaps an even higher success rate, given what happens in the other chamber).
A second explanation is that the a majority may Additionally, the traditional divided
government dummy variable is not significant in the Greater Adversity model, indicating that
party control does not exert an independent influence on presidential success in Congress. By
including measures of the other components of divided government, the party control measure
does not affect the dependent variable. This suggests that the assumption made by the use of
the traditional dummy variable, that party control matters, may not be accurate. In fact, neither
the dichotomous party control nor the continuous party seats variable significantly affects
presidential success. If party exerts any influence on this dependent variable, it does so
indirectly through ideology.
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None of the control variables is significant in Model 3. While the final version of
Model 3 includes presidential approval, it does not include either budgetary situation or
bicameral differences. Again, neither variable is significantly related to this dependent
variable. Additionally, given the small number of observations (and thus the limited degrees of
freedom), these variables were excluded from the final analyses.
Model 4 examines the effect of the Lesser Resistance (LR) measures. The results of
the LR model are similar to those of the GA model, though the Lesser Resistance Ideology
Measure is significant at the .01 level. The lower the difference between the ideology of the
president and members of Congress the greater the potential for success (and vice versa). A one
standard deviation increase in ideological distance between the president and the average
committee chairman translates to a 9.44% decrease in success, on average. As with the GA
model, seats are not significant in the LR model. Again, this may be the product of the
aggregated dependent variable, where the effects of one chamber have the opportunity to be
minimized by an opposite effect in the other legislative body. As with the GA model, the
divided party control dummy variable is not significant after including the ideology and party
seats measures, again underscoring that the assumptions made by the dummy variable may be
incorrect. As with the GA models, neither party variable significantly affects presidential
success, while the ideology component of divided government is statistically significant.
Additionally, the LR model explains the highest amount of variation in presidential
concurrence rates over this time period. While the adjusted r-squared in the other three models
ranges from .53 to .61, the LR variables explain approximately 73 percent of the variation in
aggregate presidential success in Congress. Thus the chamber that provides the least
opposition to the president, both ideologically and in terms of seats, is most influential in terms
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of how much success presidents will have with Congress.

27

This may be because presidents

turn first to the chamber that offers them the best chance of getting legislation enacted in the
hope that passing a bill in that chamber will put more pressure on the one that exhibits greater
adversity. While this possibility is not tested here, presidents may act strategically by turning
first to the chamber where they perceive the lesser amount of resistance to their agendas.
Additionally, the control variable here is significant, as increases in presidential approval are
associated with a higher probability of presidential success. As this is the less adverse chamber,
it is possible that these members are more sensitive to the president’s approval rating. The
more adverse chamber may attempt to stymie the president’s agenda, regardless of how
popular s/he may be. The lesser resistance chamber, however, may be more likely to support
the president when his/her approval is high, but may be more reticent to support an unpopular
president regardless of similar preferences. As was the case with the previous model, the other
two control variables (budgetary situation and bicameral differences) were not significant and
were subsequently excluded from the final models.

Re-Examining Mayhew: Enacting New Laws
One of the seminal studies of divided government is David Mayhew’s analysis of
major sources of legislation from 1949-1990 (the 80th – 101st Congresses). Interestingly, he

27

When the dependent variable is separated between chambers, the Greater
Adversity model better fits the data in the House of Representatives, though the overall
results are similar to those presented here with respect to the averaged dependent
variable. The Lesser Resistance model better fits the Senate data. These findings should
not be surprising, as the House of Representatives is typically the chamber that poses the
Greater Adversity, while the Senate is typically the chamber that presents the lesser
resistance to the president, both ideologically and in terms of seat allocations. This is
especially true of the 1981-1986 period, when the president’s party controlled the Senate
but not the House of Representatives.
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found no differences in the number of major laws enacted by the Congress during periods of
divided or unified party control (referred to as “divided government” in his book). One
conclusion derived from Mayhew’s study is that divided party control is not as great an
impediment to presidential leadership of Congress as conventional wisdom would suggest.
Again, Mayhew’s use of party control to define divided government still leaves the larger
question of whether “divided government” is significantly different than “unified government”
unanswered. As a result, his findings require re-examination with measures that capture both
components of divided government.
To re-examine this research, I use Mayhew’s extended Sweep One and Sweep
Two data, including pieces of legislation that were deemed significant at the time of
enactment as well as those that have been viewed as significant in retrospect. As with the
Bond and Fleisher (1990) data, Mayhew has updated his data beyond the years examined in his
book.28 I re-examine the Mayhew data, including the measures of both the party and ideology
components of divided government.
For the models examining the number of major laws passed by Congress, I present 7
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Divided Party Control Dummy – Based on Mayhew’s conclusions, I
do not expect to find a significant relationship between divided party control and the
number of major legislative enactments.
Hypothesis 2: Pre-1981 and Post-1981 Divided Party Control Dummy Variables –
I hypothesize that the effects of divided party control have not been constant over time.

28

Mayhew has updated his original dataset (1947-1990) to contain every
Congress through 2002. These data are available on Mayhew’s Divided We Govern data
page (http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/data3.html).
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I expect to find that there is no significant relationship between pre-1981 divided party
control and the dependent variable. I expect to find a negative relationship between
post-1981 divided party control and major legislative enactments in Congress. If
divided party control only exerts a significant influence on the dependent variable
during one time period, then the effect of divided party control has not been constant
over time.
Hypothesis 3: Greater Adversity Party Seats – Seats adversity will negatively affect
the number of major laws passed in Congress. As the president’s party has fewer seats
in a legislative chamber (in the chamber with the largest seat deficit), the number of
major laws passed should decrease.
Hypothesis 4: Greater Adversity Ideology - Ideological adversity will
negatively affect major legislative enactments. As the distance between the
preferences of the president and committee chairmen increases, the fewer major
laws should be passed by the legislature and signed by the president.
Hypothesis 5: Lesser Resistance Party Seats – Seats allocations will significantly
affect Mayhew’s dependent variable, with a higher percentage of seats translating into a
larger number of major laws passed. As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit
(in the chamber where he has the most seats), fewer major enactments are expected.
Hypothesis 6: Lesser Resistance Ideology – Ideological adversity will negatively
affect major legislative enactments. As the distance between the preferences of
the president and committee chairmen increases, the fewer major laws should be
passed by the legislature and signed by the president.
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Hypothesis 7: Presidential Approval Rating – Presidential approval will not
significantly affect legislative productivity in Congress. Higher levels of presidential
approval will not increase the proclivity of Congress to enact major laws.
- Table 4.2 about here Table 4.2 presents the results of these models, which employ Mayhew’s legislative
dependent variable, the amount of major legislation that is passed in Congress.29 Model 1
confirms Mayhew’s original conclusion. As is evident in the table, the divided party control
dummy is not related to the amount of major legislation enacted (which includes both sweeps
of Mayhew’s measure). Model 2 again breaks up the divided party control dummy variable
into the two periods discussed above. Unlike the findings with regard to presidential success,
there is a change in the effect of divided party control over time. Consistent with H2, the pre1981 divided party control variable is not significant, while the post-1981 variable is
statistically significant. This suggests that Mayhew’s non-finding may be time-dependent, as
the lack of a relationship in the early period may have hidden the significant relationship that is
present after the 1980 elections. Mayhew’s original study only included 9 years after the 1981

29

Mayhew also controls for a start of term dummy. Since much of this effect is
captured by the seats and ideology measures, I do not control for it in the models
presented here. All of the models were run with it included, and it was neither significant
nor did it effect the significance of other variables in the models. Also, Mayhew includes
an activist dummy variable. When included, this variable is significant in all of the
Mayhew models, but not in the presidential success rate or failed legislation models. The
variable is based on the idea that the period from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s was a
period exemplified by an activist mood. Yet, the dummy selects on the dependent
variable by fitting increases in legislation over that period. As noted by Epstein,
Kristensen, and O’Halloran (Forthcoming), and discussed in Chapter 3, this variable is
largely atheoretical and that including it does little to explain variations in this period.
Indeed it is tautological. There is increased legislative activity and hence there is an
activist mood. Because of this theoretical tautology, and the fact that it is not related to
outcomes in the other models, I do not control for it here.
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break. This also indicates that the second assumption of the divided party control dummy
variable, that the effects of divided government are constant over time, appears to be flawed.
Models 3 and 4 introduce the variables that capture both of the components of divided
government. Model 3 employs the GA measures, along with the traditional dummy variable
(which again signifies “party control”). Ideological distance is not related to the number of
major laws passed in Congress in either the GA or the LR models. The seat allocation
measure, however, is significant in the Greater Adversity Model (yet not in the Lesser
Resistance Model). So, while the dichotomous party control variable is not significant, the
continuous party strength variable (party seats) is significant. This is an interesting result.
Given that legislative success (here measured in terms of major laws passed) requires passage
in both chambers of Congress, this finding should not be overly surprising. When presidentialcongressional relations are favorable in one chamber, yet not the other, we should not expect
high numbers of legislative success. Thus, the Lesser Resistance Model may indicate the
baseline capacity for passage, but the more adverse chamber still dictates whether a law will
pass. Thus, the percentage of seats held by the president’s party in the GA chamber should be a
better indicator of legislative productivity. This conclusion is further supported by the higher
Adjusted-R2 in the Greater Adversity Model (explaining 15% of the variation in the Mayhew
DV, as opposed to less than 3% of the variation explained in the LR model). Additionally,
party control is not significant in either the GA or the LR models, suggesting that party control
does not independently drive legislative passage. Again, the significance of party seats in the
GA model indicates that the party component is still important in determining legislative
outcomes. Developing and employing measures of the other components of divided
government demonstrates that some of these components do in fact have a deleterious impact
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on the amount of major laws passed by Congress. This finding, while contrary to those of
Mayhew, is consistent with some of the more recent studies on divided government (Binder
1999; Binder 2003; Coleman 1999). This also underscores the value of the expanded definition
of divided government that I offer here.
None of the control variables is significant in any of the models examining Mayhew’s
dependent variable. Budgetary situation and bicameral differences were again excluded from
the final models presented in Table 4.2. Even though it is not significantly related to legislative
enactments, presidential approval is included in these models, as it was significantly related to
presidential concurrence in one of the models.

Failed Initiatives
Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) examined legislation that failed in Congress, rather
than how many bills passed.30 They hypothesized that the amount of failed legislation should
be higher in periods of divided government (again defined and operationalized as divided party
control), a point that they then supported statistically. This dependent variable is calculated as
the raw number of failed pieces of legislation31. As with the previous two dependent variables,
I re-examine this research by examining the effect of the components of divided government,
rather than relying on the traditional party control definition and dummy variable used in this
study. For these models, I offer the following 7 hypotheses:

30

Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) examine legislative failure in their study, as
Mayhew’s examination of the number of major laws enacted in Congress is dependent on
the total number of bills introduced. Thus, this dependent variable is distinct from
legislative passage; it is possible to have a high number of major laws that are enacted as
well as a high number of major legislative failures over the same period, or vice versa.
31
This variable has a maximum value of 40 failed initiatives (93rd Congress) and
a minimum value of 9 failed initiatives (83rd Congress).
92

Hypothesis 1: Divided Party Control Dummy – Based on the conclusions of
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997), I expect to find a significant relationship between
divided party control and the amount of failed legislation in Congress. More pieces of
legislation should fail during periods of divided party control than during unified party
control.
Hypothesis 2: Pre-1981 and Post-1981 Divided Party Control Dummy Variables –
I hypothesize that the effects of divided party control have not been constant over time.
I expect to find that there is no significant relationship between pre-1981 divided party
control and the dependent variable. I expect to find a positive relationship between
post-1981 divided party control and major legislative failures in Congress. If divided
party control only exerts a significant influence on the dependent variable during one
time period, then the effect of divided party control has not been constant over time.
Hypothesis 3: Greater Adversity Party Seats – Seats adversity will be positively
related to the number of failed pieces of legislation in Congress. As the president’s
party has more seats in a legislative chamber (in the chamber with the largest seat
deficit), the number of failed laws should decrease.
Hypothesis 4: Greater Adversity Ideology - Ideological adversity will
positively affect legislative failure. As the distance between the preferences of
the president and committee chairmen increases, more legislation should fail to
pass.
Hypothesis 5: Lesser Resistance Party Seats – Seats allocations will significantly
affect the dependent variable, with a higher percentage of seats translating into a fewer
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pieces of failed legislation. As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit (in the
chamber where he has the most seats), more failed policies are expected.
Hypothesis 6: Lesser Resistance Ideology – Ideological adversity will positively
affect legislative failure. As the distance between the preferences of the president
and committee chairmen increases, more legislation should fail to pass.
Hypothesis 7: Presidential Approval Rating – Presidential approval will not
significantly affect legislative failure in Congress. Higher (lower) levels of presidential
approval will not decrease (increase) the amount of failed legislation in Congress.
-

Table 4.3 about here –

Table 4.3 presents the results of the models examining this dependent variable.
Consistent with their results, Model 1 confirms that there is a significant bivariate
relationship between the divided party control dummy variable and the amount of
legislation that fails in Congress. Model 2 examines the effects of divided party control in
the period until 1980 and the period from 1981 onward. While the pre-1981 dummy
variable is not statistically significant, the post-1981 variable is positively related to
legislative failure (significant at the .05 level). Thus, in the post-1981 period, divided
party control was more likely to produce legislative failures. This is consistent with H2,
indicating that the effects of divided party control are not constant over the two time
periods.
In Models 3 and 4, the divided party control dummy variable is again replaced with
variables the capture the components of divided party control. The Greater Adversity Model
(Model 3) suggests that more legislation fails when the president and committee chairmen are
ideologically divergent, which is consistent with H4. As the distance increases between the
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president and Congress, legislative failure is significantly higher. However, the GA party seats
variable is not significantly related to legislative failure. It is possible that the lack of statistical
significance here is also affected by committee chairmen, or even by use of the filibuster. The
vast majority of legislation fails in committee, and these committee effects may operate
independently of seat allocations. It is also possible for legislation to be killed via a Senate
filibuster, a tactic that gives substantial power to members of the minority party. Thus, the
president’s party may have more seats in a legislative chamber, yet legislation can still fail.
Party control again has no effect on legislative failure, once the other components of divided
party control are included in the model.
Models 4 presents similar results to Model 3, though party seat allocations are
statistically significant in the LR model. While the dichotomous party control variable is not
statistically significant, again the party component of divided government is related to
legislative failure in terms of party seats. The ideological distance variable is again significant,
and in the expected direction (H6). The LR Seats measure is significantly (and positively)
related to the dependent variable, suggesting that a larger seat majority (or smaller seat deficit)
should translate into fewer failed pieces of legislation. The presidential approval variable is
negative and significant in both Models 3 and 4, suggesting that lower levels of presidential
approval will increase the proclivity of legislative failure. Again, neither budgetary situation
nor bicameral differences is significantly related to failed legislation, and both were excluded
from the final models presented in Table 4.3.
The results of the failed legislation models reinforce the importance of examining
the components of divided government. Much like the findings of Mayhew, the
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake results appear to be time-dependent. While the overall
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effect of the divided party control dummy variable (Model 1) confirms their findings,
Models 2-4 suggest that the effects of divided government on legislative failure is more
complex than their results suggest. Both the party and ideology components exert and
influence on legislative failure, though it is party strength (seats) that matters rather than
party control.

Conclusions
The analyses presented here suggest that the previous studies of divided
government have theoretical and methodological limitations. The results suggest that the
assumptions of the traditional divided government dummy variable are not supported.
First, the models indicate that party control is not driving legislative outcomes, as
previous scholarship has contended. Instead, once party seat allocations and the
ideological distance between the president and the legislature are included in the models,
party control does not independently affect the dependent variables examined here. The
second assumption, that the effects of divided government have been constant over time,
also appears to be incorrect. Divided government, and the components of the
phenomenon, appears to have a more deleterious impact on legislative outcomes in recent
years than it did at the beginning of the post-World War II period. As party seat
allocations and the ideological distance between the president and Congress has varied
greatly over this time period, the overall phenomenon of divided government has been
more complex than the traditional definition and measure have suggested.

Copyright © Jeffrey Allen Fine 2006
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TABLES: CHAPTER 4
TABLE 4.1: OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL CONCURRENCE RATES
Model 1
Divided Party
Control
Dummy
-.209
Divided Party Control
(.041)***

Model 2
Pre-1981 &
Post-1981
Dummies
----------

Model 3
Greater
Adversity

Model 4
Lesser
Resistance

-.057
(.108)

-.053
(.097)

Pre-1981 Divided
Government

----------

-.162
(.045)***

----------

----------

Post-1981 Divided
Government

----------

-.257
(.045)***

----------

----------

Greater Adversity
Party Seats

----------

----------

-.212
(.207)

----------

Greater Adversity
Ideology

----------

----------

-.157
(.084)*

----------

Lesser Resistance
Party Seats

----------

----------

----------

-.055
(.148)

Lesser Resistance
Ideology

----------

----------

----------

-.353
(.098)***

Presidential Approval

----------

----------

.002
(.002)

.003
(.001)**

Constant

.823
(.033)***

.823
(.031)***

.66
(.108)

.68
(.097)***

N
Adjusted R2

22
.5385

22
.6026

22
.6072

22
.7340

Dependent Variable: presidential concurrence rate in Congress
OLS Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

97

TABLE 4.2: OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MAJOR LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
Model 1
Divided Party
Control
Dummy
-.967
Divided Party Control
(.915)

Model 2
Pre-1981 &
Post-1981
Dummies
----------

Model 3
Greater
Adversity

Model 4
Lesser
Resistance

3.13
(2.25)

-2.08
(2.10)

Pre-1981 Divided
Government

----------

.033
(1.08)

----------

----------

Post-1981 Divided
Government

----------

-1.74
(1.01)*

----------

----------

Greater Adversity
Party Seats

----------

----------

-10.06
(4.96) **

----------

Greater Adversity
Ideology

----------

----------

-1.91
(1.98)

----------

Lesser Resistance
Party Seats

----------

----------

----------

-2.14
(4.60)

Lesser Resistance
Ideology

----------

----------

----------

3.86
(2.93)

Presidential Approval

----------

----------

-.054
(.043)

-.056
(.046)

Constant

6.3
(.718)***

6.3
(.696)***

8.23
(2.61)***

8.72
(2.99)***

N
Adjusted R2

26
.0046

26
.0657

23
.1504

23
.0252

Dependent Variable: Number of major legislative enactments in Congress (Mayhew)
OLS Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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TABLE 4.3: OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE FAILURE IN CONGRESS
Model 1
Divided Party
Control
Dummy
6.39
Divided Party Control
(3.76)*

Model 2
Pre-1981 &
Post-1981
Dummies
----------

Model 3
Greater
Adversity

Model 4
Lesser
Resistance

4.68
(7.50)

7.29
(6.54)

Pre-1981 Divided
Government

----------

3.70
(4.21)

----------

----------

Post-1981 Divided
Government

----------

10.16
(4.66)**

----------

----------

Greater Adversity
Party Seats

----------

----------

18.39
(16.86)

----------

Greater Adversity
Ideology

----------

----------

14.77
(7.02)**

----------

Lesser Resistance
Party Seats

----------

----------

----------

25.28
(14.47)*

Lesser Resistance
Ideology

----------

----------

----------

19.66
(10.97)*

Presidential Approval

----------

----------

-.434
(.142)***

-.434
(.144)***

Constant

18.44
(2.84)***

18.44
(2.79)***

39.64
(8.75)***

33.70
(9.80)***

N
Adjusted R2

21
.0864

21
.1206

19
.4260

19
.4096

Dependent Variable: number of failed pieces of legislation in Congress (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake)
OLS Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

99

Chapter 5
The Effects of Adversity:
Presidential Success on Individual-Level Roll-Call Voting (1989-2002)
Key questions:
• What effect do the components of divided government have on individual-level
legislative outcomes? Are these effects consistent with the conclusions of the
aggregate-level models?
• Do the results of individual-level models support the assumptions made by the
traditional dummy variable used in most divided government studies?
In Chapter 4, I examined the effects of adversity on three dependent variables
(presidential success in Congress, the number of major legislative enactments, and the
amount of failed legislation) in aggregate models. The results suggest that divided
government is more complex than has been previously discussed. There are several
components of divided government, and not all of these components are significantly
related to legislative outcomes. Furthermore, while the majority of studies in the
literature define divided government in terms of divided party control, it does not appear
to be significant once the other components are included. Instead, it is the strength of the
party majority and the ideological distance between the president and Congress that drive
legislative outcomes in the aggregate models.
The models examined in the previous chapter do have several limitations, each of
which will be addressed in this chapter. All of the dependent variables studied in Chapter
4 have been tracked in the post-World War II period, with the two-year Congress as the
unit of analysis. As the models replicated previous studies of divided government using
those data, the analyses had a small number of observations. Additionally, given the
aggregate nature of the dependent variables used in Chapter 4, I employed the adversity
measures that are comprised of only one legislative chamber or the other, by way of the
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Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance Models. Similarly, much of the variation in
these variables is reduced by aggregation to the two-year Congress. Lastly, the aggregate
models do not allow for measures to vary based on the content of specific bills.
Similar to the aggregate-level models of presidential concurrence rates in
Congress, this chapter examines congressional voting with the president at the level of
the individual roll-call vote. Other research has shown that there can be markedly
different results in aggregate and individual-level models that parallel each other
(Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). To demonstrate that the results presented in the
previous chapter are not the product of these limitations, I examine individual-level data
in models that do not suffer from these afflictions.

Individual-Level Models of Presidential Success
The current analysis examines every vote in the House or the Senate on which the
president stated a position from 1989 to 2002, a total of 2177 votes. This dataset was
created by expanding the Bond and Fleisher individual-level data (1990) through 2002.
To do so, I examined the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs for 1997-2002, which track
whether the president has a stated position on each roll-call vote (Austin 2003). Once
identifying the relevant presidential position votes, I collected data on the vote outcomes,
vote date, presidential approval rating, and referring committee(s).
This time period includes periods of unified and divided government under both a
Democratic and Republican president: unified government with a Democratic president
from 1993-1994, divided government with a Democratic president from 1995-2000,
unified government with a Republican president from January to June of 2001, and
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divided government under a Republican president from 1989-1992 and from June, 2001
to 2002.
The dependent variable here is whether the president “won” on a particular rollcall vote. In other words, this variable is coded as a “0” when the president opposed a
bill that was passed in that specific chamber, and when the president favored a bill that
was defeated in that chamber. The variable is coded as a “1” when the president
supported a bill that passed, and when he opposed a bill that was defeated in a vote. As
this is a dichotomous dependent variable, I employ a logit model to determine which
variables affect the probability of a presidential victory on a specific roll-call vote.
The independent variables used in this model are the same as those used in the
previous chapter, though the operationalization of these variables has changed as a result
of the individual-level unit of analysis. The previous chapter examined dependent
variables that spanned both legislative chambers, and as a result employed the Greater
Adversity and Lesser Resistance measures. As this chapter analyzes the outcome of each
individual vote, the GA and LR models are not necessary. To examine the effect of the
components of divided government on presidential success in this manner requires a
slightly different measure than those used in Chapter 4. The measures used here are
specific for each particular vote.
The model presented here examines the effect of the components of divided
government on individual-level presidential success. Measuring party control is
straightforward, though here it captures whether the president’s party controls the
chamber in which the specific vote is held. For example, when the president’s party
controls the House of Representatives (but not the Senate) in 2002, a vote in the House
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would be coded as a “1” for party control, while a vote in the Senate would be coded as a
“0.” The party seat allocation variable here, “seats adversity,” measures the difference
between the percentage of seats held by the president’s party and the opposition party in
that specific chamber. Positive values of this variable present a more favorable situation
for the president, as he holds a seat majority in that chamber. Conversely, negative
values translate into a seat deficit for the president in that chamber. The “ideological
adversity” measure again captures the distance between the president and the committee
chairmen. However, examining presidential success at the level of the individual roll-call
vote allows for a more precise measure of the preferences of committee chairmen. For
each vote, I determined to which committee each roll-call vote was referred32. I then
calculated the ideological distance between the president and the chairman of the
committee to which the bill was referred.33 Operationalizing the components of divided
government in this manner allows for a much more precise examination of these
relationships.
As with the Chapter 4 models, I control for the president’s approval rating and
budgetary situation. The presidential approval measure used in the previous models was
the average approval rating in the Gallup Poll over a two-year period. This certainly
strips much of the variation from the original approval data. The current analysis
includes the approval rating of the president at the time of the roll-call vote34.

32

The Library of Congress’s THOMAS website contains committee referral
information for every bill introduced since 1989 (http://thomas.loc.gov).
33
For bills that were referred to multiple committees, I calculate the average score
for the chairmen of these committees.
34
It is not appropriate to control for bicameral differences in a model that
examines outcomes that are specific to only one legislative chamber. Binder’s measure
was developed for her study of gridlock, which examines the lack of productivity in
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For this individual-level model, I present 5 hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Party Control – I expect party control to be significantly related to
presidential success in the bivariate model. When the other components of divided
government are included, I expect party control to no longer affect success (based on
the findings from Chapter 4).
Hypothesis 2: Party Seats Adversity – Seat allocations will be significantly related to
presidential success. As this variable represents the gap between the percentage of
seats held by the president’s party and the percentage held by the opposition party, the
relationship is expected to be negative. When the opposition party holds a larger
percentage of seats than the president’s party, the president’s success rate should
decrease.
Hypothesis 3: Ideological Adversity – I expect the ideological distance between the
president and relevant committee chairmen to be significantly and negatively related to
presidential success. As the distance between these actors increases, the probability of
a presidential victory on a roll-call vote should decrease.
Hypothesis 4: Presidential Approval Rating – I expect presidential success to be
significantly related to presidential success, in the positive direction. President’s with a
higher approval rating should have more success in Congress, even if this effect is
smaller (and only “at the margins”).
Hypothesis 5: Budgetary Situation – I expect the national budgetary situation to be
significantly related to presidential success, in the positive direction. As hypothesized

Congress as a whole (again, a dependent variable that spans both chambers). As the
models presented in this chapter examine votes either in the House or the Senate, no such
control is necessary.
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by Mayhew (1991) and Binder (2003), president’s should have more success in
Congress when the economy is doing well.
-Table 5.1 about here –
Table 5.1 presents the Logit analysis, examining determinants of presidential
success on individual-level roll-call votes. In Model 1, party control is significantly
related to presidential success, and in the expected direction (H1). The probability of a
presidential victory on a vote is increased when his/her party also controls the legislative
chamber. Presidential approval is also positively related to the dependent variable, as
higher approval ratings translate into a higher probability of a presidential victory
(consistent with H4). In Model 1, budgetary situation is not statistically signifncant.
Models 2 and 3 substitute the other components of divided government for party
control of the legislative chamber. As expected (H2 and H3), both the strength of the
president’s partisan majority (seats) and ideological adversity measures are significantly
related to presidential success, and in the negative direction. As the president’s party
faces a larger seats deficit in a chamber, his probability of success decreases. Similarly,
as the ideological distance between the president and the relevant committee chairmen
increases, the likelihood of a presidential victory in Congress decreases.
Model 4 presents the full model, with each of the components of divided
government included, along with the president’s approval rating. Once party seat
allocations and ideological distance are included in the model, party control is no longer
statistically significant (consistent with H1). Party seats and ideology remain
significantly related to the dependent variable, and in the expected direction (H2 and
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H3)35. These findings are consistent not only with the hypotheses, but also with the
results of the aggregate-level models presented in Chapter 4. These findings underscore
that both party and ideology affect legislative outcomes at the individual level, though the
influence of the party component manifests itself through the size of the partisan majority
rather than through simple control of the chamber (as has previously been argued in the
literature).
The two control variables, presidential approval at the time of the vote and the
national budgetary situation, are significant at the .01 level in both Models 3 and 4.
While presidential approval has a positive effect on roll-call success for the president
(consistent with H4), the national budgetary situation negatively related to presidential
success (contrary to H5). This is a counter-intuitive finding, as it suggests that the
president should have more success in Congress when the national budgetary situation is
poor.
Because the magnitude of the effects are difficult to compare using logit
coefficients, I now present predicted probabilities, generated using CLARIFY36. Table
5.2 presents the effect of a change in each of the components of divided government,
while holding the values of the other values constant.
-Table 5.2 about here –
35

Party control is highly correlated with ideological adversity. Thus, it is possible
that party control is also significantly related to presidential success rate. However, the
potential multicollinearity does not question the significant effect of ideology and seat
allocations on presidential success rate, as any multicollinearity would only inflate the
standard errors of these variables and decrease their significance levels. Given their
significance in the face of potential multicollinearity, these may be conservative estimates
of the effects of these other components of divided government.
36
CLARIFY was developed by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King,
and is available on King’s webpage (http://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml). This program
generates predicted probabilities of Y, given specifications of X(s) inputted by the user.
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With the other variables at their mean, a change from unified party control to divided
party control translates into an 8 percent decrease in predicted presidential success (61
percent under unified party control versus 51 percent under divided party control). A one
standard deviation increase in the seats adversity measure would yield a 16 percent
decrease in the predicted probability of a presidential victory on a vote. This change is
significant at the .01 level. Lastly, a one standard deviation increase in the ideological
distance between the president and relevant committee chairman would lead to a 23
percent decrease in the predicted probability of presidential success, holding the values of
the other variables constant.
While these predicted probabilities provide a more meaningful interpretation of
the logit coefficients, it is hard to visualize what a “one standard deviation change” would
mean in terms of “real world” scenarios. The following section presents more tangible
examples that illustrate the effect of the components of divided government.

Recent Examples
In June of 2000, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont switched his partisan
affiliation from Republican to Independent, shifting the balance of power from a slim
Republican majority (50-50, with Vice President Cheney serving as the tie-breaker) to a
slim Democratic majority (50-49, with Jeffords caucusing with the Democrats).
Following the Jeffords defection, conservative pundits asserted that it was likely that the
liberals in control would stymie President Bush’s agenda, causing a high likelihood of
policy gridlock. While this view may have been valid, what remained unclear is what
aspect of the new Democratic majority would have this effect. One possibility is that

107

having a simple majority of seats would have allowed Tom Daschle and his colleagues to
enact favorable policies and suppress the president’s agenda when bills came up for a
vote. The Republican minority, however, still had the ability to filibuster, barring an
unlikely cloture vote involving 10 Republicans. A second possibility is that the shift in
partisan control of the committee leadership might have affected policy outcomes. In
other words, the power of the committee chairmen to serve as gatekeepers may have been
driving gridlock, by killing legislation without ever allowing it to come up for a vote. A
third possibility is that some combination of these factors would drive gridlock, as
Democratic committee chairmen could kill unfavorable legislation in committee, while
the Democratic majority would have the votes on any bills that were referred back to the
floor. Based on the analyses presented thus far, it seems likely that party control itself
did not affect legislative outcomes in the wake of the Jeffords defection. Rather, the shift
in the committee chairmanships and the slight shift in party seat allocations may have
been more important.
Other recent scenarios have been centered on committee chairmen, and how they
may affect outcomes in Congress. When the Republican leadership determined which
senators would become chairmen of which committees following the 2002 midterm
elections, several of their choices were quite conservative. One of the most glaring
examples was the selection of Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma to serve as chairman of the
Environment and Public Works committee. In roll-call votes in the 107th Congress,
Inhofe had a zero percent rating from the League of Conservation Voters, an interest
group that rates members of Congress on their degree of environmentally-friendly voting
(League of Conservation Voters 2006). Nevertheless, Inhofe was made the chairman.
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Would we expect Inhofe to behave differently than a more moderate alternative? Should
the probability of an environmental bill that was referred to committee in the Senate be
markedly different than if, for example, Lincoln Chafee had been the committee
chairman?
More recently, Arlen Specter’s rise to become chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in the 109th Congress was a controversial one. Specter, one of the more
moderate Republican senators, would be replacing Orin Hatch. The debate over this
change revolved around the potential effect of Specter’s ideology on the Republican (and
Bush administration) agenda. Specifically, there were concerns over the fate of judicial
nominees. Was this debate warranted? Should we expect a Specter-led committee
behave differently than one led by Orin Hatch?
While these are different scenarios, they are all related to the questions addressed
in this dissertation. If party control drives outcomes, as the traditional definition of party
control assumes, then the Inhofe chairmanship (versus a more moderate Republican
chairman) should have no effect on committee outcomes, as the party control of the
chamber (and thus, the committee) would be the same under either chairman’s rule.
Similarly, if party seat allocations matter, we also should not expect a difference between
these chairmen, as again the seat allocations would be exactly the same in either scenario.
If, however, the ideology of the chairman matters, either alone or in terms of the distance
between the committee chairman and other actors in the system, then we should expect a
significant difference between Inhofe and a moderate alternative. In the case of the
Jeffords defection, party control of the chamber shifted from Republican to Democratic
control, though the seat allocations were nearly identical. The shift in party control
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triggered a change in the committee chairs as well, replacing Republican chairmen with
the ranking Democrat on the committee. Again, in most cases this translated into a
significant shift in the ideology of the committee chairmen. Based on the logit model
presented earlier in this chapter, what effect should we expect these changes to have on
presidential success?
To evaluate these scenarios substantively, I again use CLARIFY to generate
expected probabilities for the model presented earlier in this chapter.
-Table 5.3 about here –
The Jeffords defection changed each of the components of divided government, though
some of the changes were larger than others. While party control of the Senate shifted
from Republican to Democratic hands, there was almost no change in party seat
allocations. The Senate went from having 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats to having
49 Republicans, 50 Democrats, and 1 Independent. The shift in the ideology of the
committee chairmen was much more dramatic. Under Republican control from January
to June of 2001, the average DW-Nominate score for the committee chairmen was
.306688, relatively conservative. Not surprisingly, when the Democrats seized the gavels
in the committee chambers, the average ideology score of the chairmen became -.37931,
a relatively liberal score. As seen in Table 5.3, the Jeffords defection presented a
markedly different political environment than had existed only weeks prior. Before
Jeffords switched his party affiliation, the predicted probability of a Bush victory on a
roll-call vote was rather high, 77.81 percent. However, once Jeffords began caucusing
with the Democrats, the predicted probability of a Bush success dropped to 48.15 percent,
a 29.66 percent decrease in predicted success. While this may be partly the product of a
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shift in party control, the large shift in the ideological distance between the president and
committee chairman likely played a more critical role. To isolate the effect of a change
in committee chairmen, I revisit the other examples discussed earlier.
-Table 5.4 about here –
Returning to Inhofe’s chairmanship of the Environment and Public Works
committee allows us to examine the effect of a change in a committee chairman’s
ideology on the probability of a presidential victory. Given that the ideological adversity
score significantly affects the probability of presidential success (as discussed above),
what is the relative impact of Inhofe’s chairmanship compared to a more conservative
alternative? According to Inhofe’s DW-Nominate score, he was the third most
conservative member of the 109th Senate. President Bush’s DW-Nominate score is rather
conservative as well. Thus, the distance between the president and Inhofe ideologically
is relatively small overall. If, however, John Warner of Virginia (the 2nd ranking
Republican on the committee) had been named the chairman of the committee, the
ideological distance between the president and the chairman of this committee would
have been larger. As Table 5.4 shows, the difference between Inhofe as chairman as
opposed to Warner translates into a 3 percent difference in predicted presidential success
on a roll-call vote, holding all other variables constant (with the president’s party
controlling the chamber, and holding a 55-44-1 majority in seats). If a more moderate
Republican had been chairman (Lincoln Chafee, for example), the change in predicted
presidential success would further decline. While the shift from Inhofe to Warner is
relatively small, the shift from Inhofe to Chafee would drop the probability of a
presidential victory by another 5 percent (despite the presence of the same majority of
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seats held by the Republicans). If only party control mattered, then the ideology of any
given committee chairman should be irrelevant, once we know the party affiliation of that
chairman. In other words, unless ideology mattered, there should not be a major
difference between two Republican chairmen of the same committee. The results show
that the selection of committee chairman is not an insignificant one, and can dramatically
affect legislative outcomes. Furthermore, the results suggest that ideology component of
divided government is an important determinant of presidential success.
Arlen Specter’s ascension to the chairmanship of the Senate Judiciary Committee
in 2005 was also meaningful, justifying the fears that his rule would hamper the
president’s success on issues within the jurisdiction of this committee. Again holding the
other variables at their real levels in the 109th Congress (Republican control and a 55-441 majority), the predicted level of presidential success under Specter is significantly
lower than under the previous chairman of this committee, Utah’s Orin Hatch. Table 5.4
shows that a shift from Hatch to Specter as chairman of this committee translates into a 6
percent decrease in the predicted probability of a Bush victory on a bill referred to the
Judiciary Committee.
A final example shows a more stark difference: President Clinton during the 106th
Congress, a period of divided government in which the Republicans held a 54-46
majority in the Senate. Jesse Helms was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
committee. The distance between the DW-Nominate score of the president and Senator
Helms was 1.292 (Clinton = -.492, and Helms = .8). Consider the difference between
Jesse Helms as chairman compared to the next Republican chairman of this committee,
Richard Lugar. Lugar’s DW-Nominate score is .277, for a distance of .769 from
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President Clinton. With Jesse Helms as the chairman, the probability of a Clinton victory
on a bill referred to the Senate Foreign Relations committee is 43 percent. If Lugar had
been the chairman of this committee while Clinton was president, the predicted
probability of a Clinton victory would have been 59 percent, despite the Republican
control of the chamber leadership (and majority of votes on the floor). Thus, a change
from a more extreme committee chairman to a moderate alternative here would have
meant a 16 point difference in the predicted probability of a presidential win, even with
the same party controlling the chamber and the same seat allocations between the parties.
These examples underscore the need for the expanded definition of divided
government, one that allows for both partisan and ideological components. Rather than
party control driving presidential success, it is the allocation of seats between the
president’s party and opposition party as well as the ideological distance between the
president and key congressmen that matter.

Conclusions
This chapter examined whether the aggregate-level results presented in Chapter 4
still hold when examining individual-level data. The analyses presented here compensate
for the shortcomings of the models presented previously, expanding the number of
observations to over 1,500, and incorporating variables that are operationalized in an
issue-specific manner. Analyzing presidential success on every congressional roll-call
vote from 1989 to 2002, I find that the party seat allocations and ideological distance
between the president and relevant committee chairmen are statistically significant, while
again party control does not appear to exert an independent effect on the dependent
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variable. This further questions the traditional definition of divided government, which
states that “party control matters.”
Furthermore, the subsequent analyses presented in this chapter demonstrate the
substantive impact that these components can have on legislative outcomes. Using recent
examples, I show that shifts in the components of divided government can have
meaningful effects on presidential-congressional relations.
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TABLES: CHAPTER 5
TABLE 5.1: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON INDIVIDUAL ROLL-CALL
VOTES
Model 1
Divided Party
Control
Dummy
1.96
(.177)***

Model 2
Adversity
Measures

Model 4
Full Model

----------

Model 3
Adversity
Model with
Controls
----------

Ideological Adversity

----------

-1.68
(.245)***

-1.01
(.360)***

-1.11
(.390)***

Seats Adversity

----------

-2.68
(.652)***

-4.72
(.894)***

-5.37
(.1.32)***

Presidential Approval

.014
(.005)***

----------

.020
(.006)***

.021
(.006)***

Budgetary Situation

-.005
(.005)

----------

-.027
(.008)***

-.030
(.009)***

Constant

1.10
(.281)***

.151
(.172)***

.348
(.327)

.454
(.348)

N
Psuedo R2

1962
.0663

1522
.0892

1423
.0962

1423
.0968

Party Control

Dependent Variable: presidential success on individual vote
Logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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.309
(.463)

TABLE 5.2: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES
Predicted Presidential
Success Rate:
Party Control
Unified:
Divided:

61%
53%

Seats
Low Adversity:
High Adversity:
Ideological Distance
Low Adversity:
High Adversity:

* p < .10

** p < .05

Change:

-8%

Change:

-16%***

Change:

-23%***

62%
46%

66%
43%

*** p < .01
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TABLE 5.3 – CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES: JEFFORDS DEFECTION

Recent Example: 107th Congress:
Before Jeffords Defection
Party Control
Seat Allocations
Ideological Distance
Between President and Committee Chairmen

Republican
50 Republicans, 50 Democrats
0.255312

Predicted Presidential Success Rate

0.7781

After Jeffords Defection
Party Control
Seat Allocations
Ideological Distance
Between President and Committee Chairmen
Predicted Presidential Success Rate

Democratic
49 Republicans, 50 Democrats
0.94131
0.4815

Overall Change in Predicted Presidential Success:
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-0.2966

TABLE 5.4 – CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES: COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
Recent Example: 109th Congress:
Unified Party Control; 55 Republican seats
Predicted Presidential
Success Rate
Committee
Chairman
Envir. & Pub. Works Inhofe (R-OK)
Warner (R-VA)
Change:
Judiciary

Pr(Success):
85%
82%
-3%

Hatch (R-UT)
Specter (R-PA)
Change:

82%
76%
-6%

Recent Example: 106th Congress:
Divided Party Control; 54 Republican seats
Predicted Presidential
Success Rate
Committee
Foreign Relations

Chairman
Helms (R-NC)
Lugar (R-IN)
Change:

Pr(Success):
43%
59%
16%
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Implications
Divided government is one of the most widely examined topics in the political
science literature. This research has been particularly common over the past two
decades, as scholars grappled with the political reality that divided party control is a more
prevalent part of American national government. Yet, despite the voluminous literature
examining this phenomenon, there is still considerable disagreement about the effect of
divided government on various political outcomes. While some scholars have asserted
that divided government does not hamper presidential-congressional relations, others
concluded that periods of divided government seriously affect the political relationship
between these two constitutional actors. The present research contends that we have a
limited understanding of what divided government really means, as well as what aspects
of divided government actually affect presidential-congressional relations.
At first glance, divided government appears to be a relatively easy concept to
define. The definition employ to date asserts that this phenomenon is synonymous with
“divided party control.” Given this narrow definition, the vast majority of the studies of
divided government use a dichotomous variable to capture this phenomenon. This
dissertation contributes to the literature on divided government by expanding this
definition to include both the party and ideological components of divided government.
This broader conceptualization of divided government is a better reflection of just how
much agreement or disagreement (adversity) exists between the president and Congress.
By offering a more appropriate definition of divided government, my research
allows studies to employ measures that capture the theoretically distinct components of
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divided government to determine just what aspect of the presidential-congressional
relations affects any particular outcome. Rather than the traditional dummy variable used
in past research, scholars can examine party control, party seat allocations, and ideology
separately. Using these measures provide the added benefit of allowing researchers to
avoid making the assumptions inherent to the dummy variable that is used in most
“divided government” studies. This research demonstrates that these assumptions, that
(1) Party control of institutions is all that matters, and (2) the effects of divided
government have been constant over time, appear flawed when examined empirically. If
these assumptions were correct, then the use of a dichotomous variable would be
appropriate. However, the analyses presented in the current research demonstrate that
divided government is a much more complex phenomenon than has been previously
discussed. Rather than only being a function of party control, divided government
actually contains several distinct components. In addition to the party control that is so
commonly associated with the phenomenon, divided government is also a function of the
number of seats held by the president’s party in each legislative chamber, as well as the
policy preferences of the actors in this relationship.
These components of divided government, and their effect on legislative
outcomes, fit with existing and newly developing theories in the political science
literature. Much scholarship has discussed the effect of parties and partisanship on a
wide range of legislative outcomes. While the divided government literature speaks
directly to this broader literature on the effects of parties, by assuming that party control
is all that matters, these two literatures have remained distinct in the discipline. The other
components of divided government also have their place in the broader literature, as
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much has been written on the effect of seat majorities and ideology on the legislative
process. In fact, much of the literature on party effects has been engaged in an ongoing
debate with participants in the literature asserting that ideology drives outcomes. The
current research seeks to reconcile the divided government literature with the broader
gridlock literature on legislative outcomes by testing empirically the relative effects of
the components of divided government. The results here demonstrate that it is seat
allocations and ideological distance between the president and Congress (here
operationalized as the committee chairs), rather than party control, which drive a variety
of legislative outcomes.
Additionally, this research demonstrates that the components of divided
government have varied widely in the post-World War II period. In the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s, divided government posed a less deleterious political environment than it has
in recent decades, largely because the elected officials were less polarized. As discussed
in Chapter 3, President Eisenhower likely faced a slightly less adverse political
environment during a period of divided government in the 1950s than did his successor,
John F. Kennedy, who governed with a Democratic House and Senate. The conservative
Southern Democrats were ideologically closer to the Republican Eisenhower than to the
more liberal Democratic Kennedy. As the Democratic delegations became more liberal
in recent decades, and as the Republican delegations became more conservative (through
electoral and idiosyncratic factors), the ideological component of divided government
began to play a larger role in derailing presidential-congressional relations. This
underscores the conclusion that based on the components of divided government, there
may be a more adverse relationship between the president and Congress during a period
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of unified party control than during divided government, a possibility that has been
ignored in the divided government literature.
This dissertation suggests that scholars examining the effects of divided
government should incorporate the expanded definition of divided government offered
here, as well as the measures of the components of divided government.

Implications
The conclusions of this research have many implications for the broader political
science literature. As discussed above, this research has implications for the debate over
the antecedents of legislative success and failure. Given the relative significance of the
components of divided government, this research finds greater support for those who
argue that ideology rather than parties drives legislative outcomes (Brady and Volden
2006; Krehbeil 1998). While party control may have some effect, it is clear that simply
controlling the chamber itself does not guarantee legislative victory for the president.
Even if the same party controls the House or the Senate, as demonstrated in Chapter 5,
the presence of different committee chairs with different ideologies can greatly impact
the likelihood of presidential success. Thus, we need to move beyond a mere focus on
party control. The strength of the seats majority (or deficit) and the ideological
(dis)agreement between the president and key legislators are central to our understanding
of presidential-congressional relations.
These findings suggest that the vast majority of studies that define divided
government only in terms of party control may need to be reexamined, as this political
phenomenon is much more nuanced than it has appeared previously. This seemingly
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simple situation is in fact more complex, as divided government has several components
that are theoretically distinct. Given these separate elements, the use of a dummy
variable is not appropriate for understanding the effect of divided government on any
dependent variable. In most studies, divided government is included in the model
because it is assumed to present a more deleterious political environment for presidentialcongressional relations. However, use of the dummy variable in these research projects
capture sonly party control, not whether the relationship is adverse. Conceptually, many
of the studies that examine divided government do so because they believe the policy
preferences of the president and members of Congress will be more divergent during
divided party control than unified party control. Theoretically, these scholars want to
examine a different component of divided government (ideological adversity), yet the use
of a dummy variable actually examines only party control. The use of this flawed
dichotomous measure may mask the true nature of the relationship, explaining why so
many discrepancies exist in the present literature. Using the expanded concept of divided
government and these more nuanced and theoretically appropriate measures, scholars
may be able to reconcile some of the seemingly contradictory findings that have become
commonplace in the divided government literature. This research has addressed this
void by contributing theoretically and methodologically distinct components of divided
government.
Lastly, this research contributes to the literature examining presidentialcongressional relations in three other ways. Many scholars have wrestled with the
problem of how to examine congressional outcomes that involve both the House and the
Senate. The creation of the Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance Models allow
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scholars to examine dependent variables that span both legislative chambers, without
having to simply take the average of the House and the Senate. In addition, the current
study adds to the divided government literature by incorporating measures that more
explicitly bring the president back into the model. While previous work has focuses
primarily on the congressional side of this relationship, modeling the position of
congressmen in relation to the president provides a more meaningful measure of their
relative policy positions. Finally, it also provides a theoretical rationale for bringing
committee chairs into the analyses. This is of particular importance for future research,
particularly as the unit of analysis moves toward more policy specific areas.

Future Research
While the current research has advanced our understanding of divided
government and tested the effects of the components of divided government on various
legislative outcomes, this work presents several avenues for future research. First, the
models presented in this dissertation can be broken down further to determine whether
the effects of the components of divided government are constant across legislative
chambers. More specifically, the analyses presented in Chapter 5 combine roll-call votes
in the House and the Senate into a single model. It is possible to separate these roll-call
votes into their respective chambers to determine whether each component of divided
government has the same effect in each chamber. To do so would allow researchers to
test whether the power of committee chairmen is significantly different in the House and
the Senate. If the committee chairmen in the House of Representatives are more
powerful than their Senate counterparts, then we should expect the ideological adversity
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component to have a more significant impact on presidential success rates in the House
than in the Senate. Additionally, if the presence of the filibuster in the Senate does
increase the need for a legislative supermajority, then seat allocations may be more
important in the Senate than in the House. The larger membership in the House may also
affect the importance of seat allocations. Theses are empirical questions, ones that can
easily be addressed with the data generated for the current research.
A second area to extend the current research is to examine the effects of the
components of divided government on other dependent variables (including an analysis
of the possible changing effects of this phenomenon over time). Chapter Two discussed
numerous dependent variables that have been studied with respect to divided government
(e.g., executive orders, vetoes). Given the prominence of the methodologically and
theoretically dubious dummy variable by most of these scholars, it would be valuable to
reexamine previous findings using the components of divided government posited here.
For example, one could test the effect of the components of divided government on the
fate of judicial nominations, executive orders, and legislative “gridlock.” Importantly,
re-examining studies of judicial nominations and confirmations would allow a researcher
to employ issue specific measures of ideological adversity by incorporating the
preferences of the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. By re-examining
previous studies of divided government with these new measures, we may be able to
reconcile the contradictory findings that have prevented the divided government literature
from reaching a consensus on the effects of this phenomenon.
This research may also be extended by examining the effects of the components
of divided government on other stages in the legislative process. The vast majority of
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studies on legislative outcomes examine roll-call votes or legislative productivity/success.
However, most legislation dies in committee without ever being referred to the chamber
floor for consideration. Thus, many studies of legislative success are selecting on the
dependent variable through their examination of roll-call votes, by considering only the
most successful bills – those that make it to the floor for a vote. By considering the
antecedents of legislative success and failure at the committee stage, we may better
understand the effect of the components of divided government on the legislative process.
These future studies would build on the contributions made by this dissertation,
further developing our understanding of the complexity of divided government. By
incorporating the components (and their respective measures) of divided government into
the broader literature, we will be able to better understand the effect of this common
political occurrence on countless American political outcomes.
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